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Peter ?uroš‡
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THE HARMFUL CONSEQUENCES OF EU POLICY
TOWARD CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN
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James E. Moliterno, * Lucia Berdisová, ** Peter Čuroš, *** &
Ján Mazúr ****
ABSTRACT
In the name of judicial independence, a concept whose name is
nearly magical in its capacity to draw reflexive devotion, the European
Union (“the Union”) and Council of Europe 1 have used their
bargaining power to impose nearly uniform structural systems on the
most recent entrants with little regard for their own individual legal
cultures and social conditions. This strategy ignores the reality that
nations with the most successful systems of judicial independence,
including those of “old Europe,” reached their own judicial
* In 2006, I wrote a paper called The Administrative Judiciary’s Independence Myth, 41
Wake Forest L. Rev. 1191 (2006), in which I argued that administrative law judges (“ALJs”)
are not independent in the usual, structural sense. I noted that ALJs have some attributes in
common with civil law judges, whose job is to apply rather than make law, as common law
judges do. Since 2006, I have had the opportunity to work on various ethics issues with
developing judiciaries in Kosovo, Indonesia, Ukraine, and Slovakia. Naturally, I have learned
more about civil law judging than I could ever have learned by reading about it. These
experiences have caused me to revisit issues of judicial independence and impartiality in the
context of European court systems and those that are developing using a mixture of continental
European, UK, and US models. Thanks to Luke Graham for excellent research and editorial
assistance.
** Slovak Academy of Sciences, Institute of State and Law, Bratislava Slovakia and
University of Trnava Faculty of Law, Trnava Slovakia
*** University of Pavol Jozef Šafárik Faculty of Law, Košice Slovakia.
**** Comenius University in Bratislava Faculty of Law, Bratislava Slovakia.
1. In this Article we discuss the policies of the Council of Europe, which should not be
confused with the European Council or the Council of the European Union, which are two of
the seven core institutions of the European Union. The Council of Europe is an international
organization aiming to uphold human rights, democracy, and rule of law in Europe. It is distinct
from the European Union and has more member states than the European Union, although its
organizational scope and competences are far narrower than those of the Union.
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independence equilibrium points by their own individual paths, some
of which are not remotely similar to the others. Nonetheless, all have
had success with judicial independence. Imposing lock-step systems
has had unfortunate results on some of the new members of the Union.
Much can be learned as the Union considers its relationships with
membership aspirants, such as Ukraine and others.
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I. THE MEANING AND PURPOSE OF JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE
Scholars often disagree about the quintessential meaning and
significance of judicial independence and accountability. To avoid any
confusion at the beginning of this Article, it may be helpful to say what
the Article is and is not about. Sometimes it is the best to say at the
beginning “ceci n’est pas une pipe.” 2 This Article will not be about the
manner and form of judicial decision-making 3 or about the capacity
and propriety of a judge considering extra-legal norms. 4 It will be about
the contours of the concept of judicial independence and the specific
consequences of judicial independence systems that ill-fit their
country’s legal culture and that lack commensurate measures of
judicial accountability.
First, the precise meaning and limitations of judicial
independence will be discussed. Second, a few systems of judicial
independence, some successful and some less so, will be described.
Third, some legal history of Central and Eastern Europe (“CEE”),
especially Slovakia, will be discussed to set the stage for problems that
ensued as a result of EU-pressed systems. Fourth, the system pressed
on nearly all EU aspirants after 2000 will be explained. Fifth, some of
the dangers that have been realized in Slovakia will be described. In the
end, we encourage the European Union to be more flexible in helping
to design judicial independence systems in future post-communist
aspirant countries that better account for local conditions and legal
cultures, as well as adopt a flexible approach to current post-communist
members when they make needed adjustments to their judicial
independence systems.

2. Rene Magritte, The Treachery of Images (1928).
3. For interest on this topic, see Lawrence Alexander, Legal Theory and Judicial
Accountability: A Comment on Seidman, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1601 (1987) (inquiring into whether
the judge is independent and accountable to decide the case in a morally correct way: “what I
would say about judicial accountability, the institutional structure of the judiciary, and the
judicial selection process and criteria is the following: the ultimate problem of law is the conflict
between getting things settled and getting things settled in a morally correct way. All other
current debates—such as the debate over the legitimacy of judicial review in a democracy and
the ancillary debate over interpretive methodology, judicial selection, and tenure—boil down to
the question of how to resolve this conflict.”).
4. If interested in this issue, see RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1988); AHARON
BARAK, THE JUDGE IN A DEMOCRACY (2008); ROBERT ALEXY, A THEORY OF
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS (1985); JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW (1979).
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To understand judicial independence and accountability, we have
to consider how the other branches of state power can influence
decision making of particular judges or how the other branches of state
power can influence the judiciary as a whole, including the process of
choosing of new judges, setting or diminishing the salaries of judges,
or the disciplinary proceedings of judges.
Like most carefully defined concepts, judicial independence
exists as a matter of degree. In the narrow (and more precise) sense,
independence is about insulation from interference by the electorate
and by the elected legislative and executive branches with a judge’s
decision making. Thought of this way, some judges are more
independent than others. The phrase “judicial independence” has
gained such an aura that its mere invocation is enough to end some
conversations about it: no debate is countenanced of the possibility that
there can be too much judicial independence. But there can indeed be
too much judicial independence, and in the absence of sufficient
accountability, the consequences can be grave.
There is indeed a “right amount of judicial independence,” as we
were taught decades ago by Owen Fiss in his work on emerging
democracies in Latin America. 5 The existence of judicial
accountability in correct measures is no threat to judicial independence.
Accountability comes, for example, in the form of well-crafted and
fairly enforced judicial codes of conduct, clear standards for judicial
explanation of decision rationales, and various reasonable checks on
judicial selection and finances by other branches of government.
Impartiality as a judicial trait is often confused with
independence. Impartiality is about fair-minded, neutral decisionmaking. Independence is created primarily by structural aspects of
government to ensure that state actors are deterred from influencing
impartial judicial decision-making. Impartiality is created primarily by
the structure of the dispute resolution process. All judges are in systems
that foster impartiality; some judges are in structures that foster
independence, and independence is a matter of degree, always to be
balanced by the right amount of accountability. Independence is a
subset of impartiality, isolating only those influences that come from
the electorate or the political process or the other branches of
government. The independence subset is not necessary to the role of
5. Owen Fiss, The Right Degree of Independence, in TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN
LATIN AMERICA: THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY 55 (Irwin P. Stotzky ed., 1993).
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judge (consider US administrative law judges who are meant to be
impartial but not independent), but is a highly desirable attribute if the
judge is meant to check the other branches.
Impartiality is the broader concept, an ability to resolve a dispute
free of any inappropriate influence, including influence by state actors.
Independence is only about influence or fear of influence by state
actors. Many threats to impartiality exist that are not properly classified
as independence issues.
Is independence a fundamental attribute of a judge? There are
competing definitions and classifications regarding independence, and
even cooperating institutions do not offer a common treatment of the
concept. In Europe, this somewhat confusing mixture of definitions and
the systems they generate is clearly visible. On the one hand, levels of
independence are classified by consultative organizations of the
Council of Europe (“CoE”) called Consultative Council of European
Judges (“CCJE”) on statutory, functional and financial bases. 6 By
another institution, European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice
(“CEPEJ”), independence is discussed in terms of being internal and
external. 7 Still another classification system of independence by the
European Network of Councils of the Judiciary (“ENCJ”), the
consultative institution of the European Commission, exists on the
basis of objective independence of the judiciary as a whole, including
objective independence of the individual judge and subjective
independence. 8 And these contrasting systems for describing
independence in Europe have produced a wide range of judicial
independence systems across the pre-2000 members of the European
Union.
In the end, what is independence in the judicial sense? 9 Properly
understood, judicial independence is a wonderful thing—an essential
6. Magna Carta of Judges, CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL OF EUR. JUDGES (Nov. 17, 2010),
https://rm.coe.int/16807482c6 [https://perma.cc/MP6Q-A7DT].
7. Committee of Ministers, Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12 of the Committee of
Ministers to member states on judges: independence, efficiency and responsibilities (Nov. 17,
2010).
8. EUROPEAN NETWORK OF COUNCILS OF THE JUDICIARY, INDEPENDENCE,
ACCOUNTABILITY AND QUALITY OF THE JUDICIARY (2016-2017), available at
https://www.encj.eu/images/stories/pdf/workinggroups/independence/encj_report_ia_ga_adopt
ed_ga_13_6.pdf [https://perma.cc/VTH5-VWWM].
9. See generally Irving R. Kaufman, The Essence of Judicial Independence, 80 COLUM.
L. REV. 671 (1980); Stephen B. Burbank, What Do We Mean By “Judicial Independence”?, 64
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thing for a just and prosperous nation. Abused, or improperly
understood, “judicial independence” is a tool of corruption and
injustice.
It is critical to see what judicial independence is and what it is not.
Judicial independence is meant to empower judges to be just. Judicial
independence prevents the government from placing its thumb on one
side of the scales of justice. It prevents the government from interfering
with a judge’s impartial decision of a case according to the law and the
facts. But judicial independence is not permission for judges to engage
in wrongdoing. It is not a defense to the requirement of making
transparent decisions. It is not an impregnable force-field that prevents
judges from being accountable for the quality and integrity of their
judicial work.
Judges in even the most independent systems in the world are
charged with crimes when they break the law, when they decide cases
not on the law and the facts but to favor the interests of themselves,
their friends, their family, or their colleagues. Judicial independence is
not permission to be unlawful, nor is it permission to engage in
arbitrary decision-making behind the gloss of legal forms.
Judicial independence belongs to the people of a nation, both
litigants and non-litigants, not to the judges. Judicial independence
allows the judges to act in impartial ways to do justice for the people
and businesses of a nation. It is not property of the judges themselves,
but rather an instrumental concept that favors justice and fair
application of the law. Independence is the right of the people towards
the government. Independence and accountability are preconditions for
trust from the population. When the judiciary is not independent, it can
lead to an assumption that when legislative or executive power harms
an individual, the judiciary does not have the power to save the
individual from these interests. If there is too much independence
without sufficient accountability, undesirable consequences could lead
to mistrust in the judiciary because of lack of transparency and
blindness of whose interest is fulfilled by judicial action. The role of
judicial independence is to guarantee for all who will become a party
before a court, that the decision of the court will not be influenced by

OHIO ST. L.J. 323 (2003); Charles G. Geyh, Judicial Independence, Judicial Accountability, and
the Role of Constitutional Norms in Congressional Regulation of the Courts, 78 IND. L.J. 153
(2003).
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state powers through the leverage of the appointment or election,
control of compensation, or assignment of the case to a biased judge.
Unaccountable independence can have damaging consequences
as serious as those resulting from a lack of independence from other
powers or entities. Unaccountable independence fosters secrecy and
lack of transparency within a judiciary. Secrecy and lack of
transparency unsurprisingly cause public distrust of the judiciary.
Properly understood, judicial independence gives people faith in
justice and confidence in judges. It allows people to know that the
government will not decide disputes; the law will. It allows people and
businesses to know that judges are not owned by anyone, that judges
owe no higher duty than the duty they owe to justice.
Only in a nation where justice is trusted can people and businesses
act with confidence and live their lives knowing that the law will
resolve the inevitable disputes that arise. When people and businesses
believe in justice, they invest in the future and everyone benefits.
Without properly understood judicial independence, society
flounders. People and businesses resolve disputes in dark rooms behind
closed doors, sometimes by unlawful arrangements. If judges are not
to be trusted, people think, why should I depend on the law? Why
should I play by the rules? In such a society, all suffer the
consequences. Taxes go uncollected and the needy suffer, roads are
poor, public projects are stymied.
When reliance on judicial rulings is low, lawyers try to hedge
extensively and outsource many functions of the judiciary outside of
the court system. There are at least two types of cost attached to this:
(1) real costs, related to the fact that some of the most reputable law
firms in such a system regularly advise their clients to opt for
arbitration courts to avoid unpredictable and biased decisions. This
means that costs for even minor business disputes are significantly
higher than they would otherwise be; and (2) sunk-costs attached to the
fact that decisions may be unpredictable, biased, lengthy, or
unprofessional.
Independence is not a blank check or free pass for a judge to act
how she pleases. It needs to be balanced by accountability. It is a
mistake to imagine the relation of the independence and accountability
as a spectrum such that on the left end would be independence and on
the right end would be accountability. Such a view would produce
results such as independence being at 100% and accountability at 0%,
or independence being at 25%, and accountability at 75%. The relation
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of accountability and independence is different. Accountability and
independence do not lay on opposite sides of a spectrum. Instead it is
more appropriate to imagine it as a coin, where on one side is an
appropriate amount of independence and on the other there is
essentially the same amount of accountability. Without having equally
balancing sides to a single coin, the judiciary, the public cannot believe
in justice. The public sees judges who do as they please and hide their
improper motives and act behind a shield of judicial independence.
A critical problem is the absence of objective criteria by which
accountability may be measured by the public. Since judges are
generally not meant to be politically accountable (except, for example,
in some US states where they are elected), the public has little
information or capacity by which they may hold judges accountable.
There are two structural devices that offer the best options for holding
judges accountable. First, clear codes of conduct, fairly enforced,
charges under which may be initiated by any member of the public hold
some promise of increasing accountability. Second, accountability can
be significantly enhanced by a legal requirement or culture that
commands judges to clearly and thoroughly explain their decisions in
writings that are easily accessible to any member of the public.
To conceptualize judicial independence further, we must
distinguish between judicial independence on the level of decision
making of individual cases and judicial independence on the level of
the whole judiciary and court structure. The former must be understood
as a value in itself, an elementary precondition of fair trial and
democratic regimes. It implies freedom to decide cases independently,
but also to behave independently of any state power. 10 It requires
judges to objectively apply the law to the facts of the case. The latter,
on the other hand, has a more instrumental and mechanistic nature; we
refer to structural independence as a means to support and strengthen
the formal independence. Structures prevent the executive power or
other powerful actors from encroaching the judiciary and attempting to
influence individual cases.
It is normally understood that this threat to independence comes
from outside of the judiciary; the judiciary was treated as an object of
attacks and threats. These risks have been seen in efforts to support the
10. Maria Popova, POLITICIZED JUSTICE IN EMERGING DEMOCRACIES: A STUDY OF
COURTS IN RUSSIA AND UKRAINE (2012); Samuel Spáč, By the Judges, For the Judges: The
Study of Judicial Selection in Slovakia (2017) (unpublished dissertation, Comenius University).
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judiciary by strengthening its independence from potentiallyinterfering state actors. In practical terms, these efforts traditionally
represented a transfer of powers from ministries or other state organs
to the judiciary. Yet, in the countries this Article focuses on, little
attention was paid to the possibility that the judiciary itself may very
well include leading, powerful actors threatening the independence of
individual courts or judges. The judiciary is not an inanimate object but
consists of judges with their own minds and interests. A judiciary may
show tendencies to use its own powers for its own benefit in situations
where the composition of the branch is rather homogenous, its internal
structures and members are interrelated and interdependent more on
each other than on the outside actors, i.e., showing signs of structural
independence, but internal dependence. As a result of this framework
threats to independence can “result from the interplay between capacity
and willingness of powerful actors to threaten independence, and
resistance of judicial actors to such actions,” where the powerful actors
may include leading judges or groups of judges. 11 The extent to which
a judiciary is independent is thus contingent not only on the strength of
threats and attacks from outside, but also on the resistance manifested
by the judiciary. A judiciary is therefore an actor in its own right; to
some extent it chooses to be independent, and how to resist threats both
from without and within.
II. LONG-STANDING SYSTEMS OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
ARE NOT ONE-SIZE FITS ALL
In nations where judicial independence is properly understood and
followed, justice is not perfect, but it is expected. Failures of justice
and corruption are unusual even though they do happen. Decisions are
made with which some people disagree, and some number of decisions
may even be incorrectly decided. Independent judges are not punished
for honest mistakes or for making a decision in a difficult case with
which some disagree. But they are expected to resist threats to their
independence so that they may decide cases fairly based on only law
and fact.

11. Spáč, supra note 10, at 127.

490

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 42:2

A. UNITED STATES
Even the most independent US judges, which are judges under
Article III of the US Constitution (“Article III judges”), are not
completely and literally independent. 12 A significant group of judges
who deliver an enormous amount of justice are not meant to be
independent at all.13 Despite these less-than-thorough markers of
independence, the US judiciary is widely regarded as the gold standard
for judicial independence. “Independence” literally means the absence
of dependence, which is to say complete autonomy and insusceptibility
to external guidance, influence, or control. If we think of judicial
independence in literal terms, however, federal judges are not
“independent,” at least not as dictionaries define the word. They are not
autonomous, because Congress retains ultimate control over their
budget, jurisdiction, structure, size, administration, and rulemaking.
Moreover, they are susceptible to outside influence; if judges engage
in behavior (on or off the bench) that the political branches characterize
as criminal, they may be prosecuted and imprisoned; if they make
politically unacceptable decisions, the President and Senate may
decline to appoint them to higher judicial office; if they commit “high
crimes and misdemeanors,” they may be impeached and removed from
office; if they make decisions with which higher courts disagree, their
decisions may be reversed; and if they engage in behavior that judicial
councils regard as misconduct, they may be disciplined. 14
“Federal judges are thereby rendered autonomous in the limited
sense that they have an enforceable monopoly over ‘the judicial
power,’ and are insulated from two discrete forms of influence or
control, namely, threats to their tenure and salary” 15; that is what makes
Article III judges independent. Why are they not completely
independent? The answer is that “increased judicial independence is
not always better.” 16 Judicial independence is not an end in itself; it is
12. See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 9, at 326–27; Terri Peretti, A Normative Appraisal of
Social Scientific Knowledge Regarding Judicial Independence, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 349, 349 (2003)
(claiming that “[e]vidence abounds that American judges possess only a modest amount of
independence”).
13. James Moliterno, The Administrative Judiciary’s Independence Myth, 41 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 1191 (2006).
14. Geyh, supra note 9, at 159.
15. Id.
16. Frank B. Cross, Thoughts on Goldilocks and Judicial Independence, 64 OHIO ST. L.J.
195, 195 (2003); Fiss, supra note 9.
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a means to an end. 17 It ought to be curtailed when it ceases to be
conducive to that end. 18
What, then, is the purpose, the end served, of Article III judicial
independence? While in part, independence enhances impartiality, that
enhancement is far from the primary purpose of independence. Most
fundamentally, independence “preserve[s] the integrity of the judiciary
as a separate branch of government.” 19 To be most useful, individual
judges should be able to decide cases without being influenced by
anything other than the facts and the law, and the judiciary should
function as a third branch of government and check the other two.
However, at the same time the judiciary must be restrained from
running amok and doing whatever it wants. So guarantees of judicial
tenure and salary should exist, but not guarantees that the entire
judiciary will be free from any checks from the other branches. The
best balance employs elements of both independence and
accountability in the formulation of our federal judiciary. But to make
the judicial checks on the other branches meaningful, the Article III
balance is decidedly tilted toward independence and away from
accountability.
These formal accountability checks on the courts are almost never
used, even though they are technically available to Congress, 20 perhaps
because Congress does not want to interfere with judicial
independence, perhaps for fear of partisan tit-for-tat. There is,
therefore, a definite “tension” between independence and

17. See Burbank, supra note 13, at 323.
18. See Geyh, supra note 13, at 163 n.29 (“[T]hat judicial independence is not an end in
itself, but an instrumental value that serves another end.”)
19. Id. at 162; see also John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges,
Dependent Judiciary: Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 962 (2002)
(arguing that the end of independence and accountability is “a well-functioning system of
adjudication”); Cross, supra note 20 (explaining that judicial independence is “freedom from
control by the other political branches of government”); Elizabeth A. Larkin, Judicial Selection
Methods: Judicial Independence and Popular Democracy, 79 DENV. U. L. REV. 65, 65 (2001)
(explaining that judicial independence enables courts to “serve as an institutional check on the
legislative and executive branches and that judicial independence is essential for the judiciary to
protect the rule of law”) (footnotes omitted); Irving Kaufman, The Essence of Judicial
Independence, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 671, 691 (1980) (explaining that the Supreme Court’s
definition of judicial independence has stated as its purpose keeping the judiciary “free from
undue interference by the President or Congress”); and Irving Kaufman, Chilling Judicial
Independence, 88 YALE L.J. 681, 713 (1979).
20. Geyh, supra note 13, at 164.
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accountability. How can we resolve this tension, keeping judges
accountable to the other branches while not beholden to them?
The political branches struck a constitutional balance over time
between judicial accountability and independence. 21 This balance,
which is represented by customary independence, can be altered by the
political branches. 22 Similarly, the courts may alter the scope of
doctrinal independence. 23 Though doctrinal independence and
customary independence are bound to constitutional norms, functional
independence is “shaped by the vagaries of any given day’s public
policy.” 24 This customary independence is not, of course, inviolable.
However, methods of constraining the judiciary which have
traditionally been considered antithetical to judicial independence are
presumptively unconstitutional according to this scheme. Essentially,
Geyh argued that Congress has refrained from interfering with this
“customary independence” because it has so interpreted the
Constitution as to make such interference unconstitutional. Congress
is, by so doing, exercising self-restraint, 25 just as courts occasionally
do.
Article III judges, as members of courts made up of several judges
(e.g., the Supreme Court, the courts of appeal, and the district court
panels), are themselves the product of a combination of executive and
legislative choice. 26 The selection and confirmation process is a real
but modest detraction from judicial independence. Although each
individual Article III judge may be almost entirely insulated from
legislative and executive oversight once confirmed (there remains only
the impeachment threat), even they are less than perfectly independent.
They remain as members of courts the composition of which will be
influenced by future appointments. Even seeming lone ranger district
court judges have changing panels of future appellate courts to which
to look forward. Nonetheless, Article III judges possess the greatest
measure of independence of any American judges.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id. at 165.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS: A
CONSTITUTIONAL & HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 141 (2003) (discussing the 1999 choreographed
exchange between President Clinton and Senator Orrin Hatch, where Senator Hatch agreed to
move pending judicial nominations through the confirmation process as long as the president
kept Senator Hatch’s preferred candidate’s name moving through the nomination process).
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Where does this leave accountability, however, if Congress has
progressively abandoned the constitutionally permitted methods of
curbing the courts? Perhaps it lies entirely in the appointment process.
The appointment process is the only constitutional restraint on the
judiciary that Congress has shown itself willing to exercise; every other
method (e.g., adjusting court size, reducing court budgets, and
impeachment for unfavorable decisions) has been gradually
abandoned, forming the “customary” independence of Article III
courts. Therefore, the appointment process stands as the only
remaining check on Article III independence, which ensures the
judiciary’s integrity as a third branch of government, allowing it to
serve as a check on the two others, and which also guarantees its own
accountability. 27
But the formal accountability systems are not actually the chief
form of judicial accountability in US-style systems. Instead, a large
measure of accountability derives from the tradition of explaining
judicial decisions thoroughly, in writing, and in documents that are
easily accessible to the legal community, the media, and indeed any
member of the public. The process of explanation of rationale connects
judicial decisions with public discourse. First, the judge who must
explain her decision is a judge who will decide more carefully and with
greater focus on accuracy. Second, the legal community, especially the
academic legal community, can engage the quality and reasoning of
decisions that are explained in writing. Third, the media and the general
public, sometimes informed by media, are enabled to apply and express
the public will regarding the rationale and reasoning of the judge. In
ordinary life, people are more likely to accept and respect a decision
that affects them if the decision-maker has been willing to explain
himself. Some credit is given to the good-will of a decision-maker (an
employment supervisor, a parent, a legal authority) when an
explanation accompanies a decision. People may still disagree with the
decision, but they pay greater respect to it when it is thoroughly
explained. This form of accountability is tangible and a well-engrained
part of the US culture, applying to both federal and state judges,
including administrative judges.

27. Whether or not reducing congressional control of the judiciary entirely to the
appointment process does in fact maintain judicial accountability is not at issue here; we are
only concerned with the principles behind the facts, not the facts themselves.
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Some would say that this judicial decision-making attribute is
uniquely a common law system one. But that is not accurate. Civil
codes describing the document to be produced by a deciding judge
articulate the necessity of a “reasoning” or “rationale” section in the
judgment document. Too often, this section is treated in a highly
formalistic way, with a simple rendition of the governing articles of the
code that were applied by the judge. But there is nothing that would
prevent civil law judges from actually providing written reasoning or
rationale in such a section of their judgments. Doing so would enhance
both accountability and, over time, public trust.
Many state court judges have a high degree of independence from
the legislative and executive, but less than that of Article III judges.
State judges lack life tenure and perfect protection against
compensation reduction. State court judicial selection and renewal
processes result in structures less friendly to independence than those
of Article III judges. Elected state judges have significant
independence from the legislative and executive but must answer to the
electorate and have a lower measure of independence from the people
as a result. To be sure, in many states, terms are long 28 and re-election
processes so substantially favor incumbents that this reduction from
life tenure may in practice be modest. But it exists to some measure in
all instances. Given the new freedom to campaign in judicial
elections, 29 independence from the electorate is likely to diminish
further for elected judges. Appointed state judges begin with some form
of the same input from the other branches, like Article III judges, but
their renewal processes substantially decrease their once-appointed
independence. These judges must stand for reappointment by either the
executive or the legislative branches periodically and risk termination
when they act in ways that displease the branch that considers their
renewal. While appointed judges are less beholden to the electorate
than elected judges, they remain just a step removed: the branch that
renews judges is itself subject to the winds of electoral change.
28. See Paul W. Kahn, Interpretation and Authority in State Constitutionalism, 106 HARV.
L. REV. 1147, 1156 (1993); Donald A. Dripps, Fundamental Retribution Error: Criminal Justice
and the Social Psychology of Blame, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1383, 1435 (2003); Paul M. Bator, The
State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 605, 630 (1981).
For information on state judicial term limits, see 37 THE BOOK OF THE STATES 318-21, tbl. 5.6
(2005) (including examples of long terms for state judges such as 14-year initial terms for trial
level judges in New York, 12-year terms in Delaware, and 10-year terms in Pennsylvania).
29. Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002); Weaver v. Bonner, 309
F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2002).
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There are two sets of system attributes that support independence.
One is structural and the other relational. Both are necessary
ingredients of success independence systems.
One set is structural. Federal judges are selected through a process
that involves both of the other branches; they have life tenure; and their
salary cannot be reduced. However, state judges live in a system that is
less structurally friendly to independence. Many are elected; some are
selected by legislatures; most are closer to the political process for one
reason or another; and their court budgets are subject to local political
contests. When these structural attributes are present, as they are in the
federal judicial system, they tend to foster independence from
interference by the other branches.
The other set is largely relational rather than structural. Judges are
insulated from most ex parte communication; they are not to be the
recipient of extravagant gifts; and they must monitor their outside
interests. These rules are largely meant to foster judicial independence
from inappropriate influence by the parties to litigation or others
interested in the outcome of litigation. This set of attributes might more
accurately be said to foster impartiality more than they foster
independence.
In some sense, independence is a personal trait. Structures can
foster it or not. On some level, however, judges are or are not
independent because of their personal qualities. State judges might act
independently of political influence from the other branches and of the
electorate, even though structures do not lend support to such conduct.
Such judges run the risk of being ex-judges, and when that occurs, the
structures have won. In any event, even judges of independent spirit
and inclination are not independent in the judicial sense when their
decisions are subject to direct, de novo review.
Independence is not an essential attribute of judging. While many
state court judges may function with high levels of independence,
structures to foster high levels of independence are not in place in most
states. One can only conclude that state government founders did not
regard judicial independence with the same regard as did federal
government founders. Independence, at least the structural
independence from interference from the other branches, is most
important when the judiciary is expected to function in a countermajoritarian manner.
Therefore, even within the United States, judges function with
impartiality and quality even though the systems for ensuring their
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independence vary quite substantially between federal and state judges.
Systems also differ widely from state to state at that level. Judicial
independence systems are not one-size fits all, even within the United
States
B. Judicial Independence in Western Europe and “Old” European
Union Member States
Several international organizations have developed standards to
help states understand what it means for a judicial system to be
independent. 30 The standards produced by these international
organizations focus on certain structural characteristics. 31 They
consider, for example, the degree of separation between the judiciary
and the other branches of government, the judiciary’s involvement in
its own administrative oversight, and the amount of individual
authority judges have to decide cases freely. 32
Although international standards are helpful in analyzing the
independence of a state’s judiciary, applying general standards across
Europe should be done with caution. Judicial independence is practiced
differently across the continent because its development is heavily
influenced by each state’s unique cultural and legal history. 33 It is
therefore helpful to discuss judicial independence by taking a look at
how the concept has developed regionally instead of looking at Europe
as a whole. Particularly, how judicial independence has played out in
Western Europe and other European Union member states as compared
to its development in CEE.
There are different models of safeguarding judicial independence
across Europe. 34 For example, in Spain, there is the judicial council,
30. OPEN SOCIETY INSTITUTE, MONITORING THE EU ACCESSION PROCESS: JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE 17, 26–31 (Cent. Eur. Univ. Press 2001) (citing several sources of standards of
judicial independence including the EU, ECHR jurisprudence and other international
organizations).
31. Id. at 27.
32. Id.
33. John Adenitire, Judicial Independence in Europe: The Swedish, Italian and German
Perspectives 3 (2012) (unpublished manuscript).
34. As CoE mentions, “The aim of this Opinion is to identify the core elements in relation
to the general mission, composition and functions of the Council for the Judiciary with a view
to strengthening democracy and to protecting the independence of the judiciary. The Opinion
does not present a detailed description of principles for the composition or the functions of the
Council for the Judiciary, neither does it create a single model for the Council for the Judiciary
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which is independent to a large extend, not entirely unlike those
currently in CEE. The Spanish judiciary is seen as somewhat isolated
from the rest of the state. 35 By contrast, the German model features
more control by the Ministry of Justice. 36 In general, member states in
the south adopted judicial councils that have powers over appointment
and evaluation of judges. Northern member states tend to have judicial
councils that have power over budgets and management of the
judiciary. In essence, the CoE proposed a model for new entrants that
would combine the Southern European model with the Northern
European model. 37 Combining the functions created exceptionally
powerful judicial councils in post-communist EU entrants.
Judicial independence was adopted among “old” EU member
states as a response to historical and cultural events that changed the
states’ outlook on the role of the judiciary. In some states, judicial
independence developed as a reaction to the increasing role law was
playing as a tool to limit government power. 38 For example, England,
in response to James II’s attempts to remove judges and intimidate
bishops, increased the independence of the judiciary by preventing
Parliament from removing judges without good cause. 39 In other
Western European countries, the idea of judicial independence
developed as a reaction to previous totalitarian rule. Both Spain and
in Europe.” See also CCJE, Opinion no.10 (2007) of the Consultative Council of European
Judges (CCJE) to the attention of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on the
Council for the Judiciary at the service of society (adopted 21-23 November 2007).
35. Mauro Cappelletti, Who Watches the Watchmen? A Comparative Study of Judicial
Responsibility, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE 550, 556 (Shimon
Shetreet & Jules Deschênes eds., 1985) (“The result is a system of what I would call,
exaggerating somewhat perhaps, individual anarchy: not only is the judiciary, to a large extent,
a corps séparé, but even every individual judge is almost like a monad which has its own separate
existence, largely aloof from internal, as well as external, controls. To be sure, this system might
still be less fearful than one of dependency from the political power; it is not, however,
necessarily less damaging.”); See also Michal Bobek, The Fortress of Judicial Independence
and the Mental Transitions of the Central European Judiciaries, 14 EUR. PUB. L. 99 (2008)
[hereinafter Bobek, The Fortress of Judicial Independence].
36. Michal Bobek & David Kosař, “Euro-products” and Institutional Reform, in
CENTRAL EUROPEAN JUDGES UNDER THE EUROPEAN INFLUENCE: THE TRANSFORMATIVE
POWER OF EU REVISITED 183 (Michal Bobek ed., 2015).
37. CCJE, Opinion no. 10 ¶ 46.
38. Anja Seibert-Fohr, European Comparatives on the Rule of Law and Independent
Courts 2 (Nov. 9, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1652598 [https://perma.cc/DG49-Z425].
39. Robert Stevens, The Independence of the Judiciary: The Case of England, 72 CAL. L.
REV. 597, 599 (1999).
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Italy, for example, developed strong, autonomous judiciaries after the
fall of fascism in Italy and the end of Francisco Franco’s reign in
Spain. 40
The differences in the origin of judicial independence have
produced varying judicial structures and degrees of independence
across Europe. Although each judicial system found in Western Europe
is different, they each face the same challenges that attempting to
maintain an independent judiciary presents. A common problem
among these states is finding a proper balance between independence
and accountability. Other states struggle with maintaining separation
between the judiciary and other political branches.
Three examples follow. Each system example is based on
historical differences in legal culture and governance systems.
Collectively, the examples demonstrate that there is no single formula
for judicial independence and successful systems must be designed
with local factors in mind.
1. Judicial Independence in Sweden
In Sweden, the requirement of an independent judiciary is
codified in their constitution: “Neither the Parliament, nor a public
authority, may determine how a court of law shall adjudicate an
individual case or otherwise apply a rule of law in a particular case.
Nor may any other public authority determine how judicial
responsibilities shall be distributed among individual judges.” 41
In order to maintain independence, threats of violence to public
officials and bribery are criminalized. 42 Sweden’s Constitution secures
tenure of permanent salaried judges. These judges may only be
removed if they reach the age of retirement or “are shown to be
manifestly unfit to hold office . . . .” 43 Sweden has balanced the need
for independence with judicial accountability through a number of
mechanisms. For example, judges are not immune from civil or
criminal liability and can be prosecuted for taking bribes. 44

40. Bobek, The Fortress of Judicial Independence, supra note 35.
41. REGERINGSFORMEN (RF) [CONSTITUTION] 11:3 (Swed.).
42. Adenitire, supra note 33, at 7.
43. Id.
44. Id.
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Although the Swedish judiciary does maintain a degree of
independence, their judicial structure leaves them vulnerable to
political and executive influence. The executive branch controls the
appointment of judges to permanent positions. As a result, associate
judges often work in governmental departments to increase their
chances of being appointed to a permanent position. 45 Further, because
there is no established independent legal service for the government,
permanent judges are brought in to provide legal advice to the
executive branch, clearly blurring the separation between the judiciary
and the executive. 46
Sweden’s judicial structure is also vulnerable to undue political
influence. In Sweden, judicial panels are made up a mix between lay
judges and permanent judges. 47 In all criminal cases and family law
cases, for example, the panel of judges consists of three lay judges and
one permanent judge, each having one vote. 48 Lay judges are elected
by political parties and serve a term of four years. The fact that political
representatives and judges sit on the same panel to adjudicate cases
greatly undermines the judiciary’s independence from politics.
2. Judicial Independence in Italy
Italy’s judiciary is extremely independent, perhaps to a fault.
Italy’s Constitution states that “[t]he judiciary . . . [constitutes an]
autonomous and independent . . .” branch of government not subject to
any other. 49 Among civil law countries, Italy is ranked as one of the
highest in terms of protections established to ensure judicial
independence. 50 In order to ensure judicial autonomy, the judicial
system is exclusively run by an independent judicial council called the
Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura (“CSM”). Similar councils are
found in France, Spain, and Portugal. The CSM is made up of judges
and has complete managerial control over the employment,
45. Id. at 8.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 9 (If the case is taken to the Court of Appeal, the panel is comprised of three
permanent judges and two lay judges).
48. Id.
49. Art. 104(1) Constituzione [Cost.] (It.).
50. Giuseppe Di Federico, Independence and Accountability of the Judiciary in Italy: The
Experience of a Former Transitional Country in a Comparative Perspective, JUD. INTEGRITY 2
(Andras Sayo ed.) (This is a modified version of the original article.).
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assignments, and discipline of judges and prosecutors. 51 Accountability
is reached in the same ways it is reached in Sweden. Italian judges can
be held criminally and civilly liable but cannot be punished for their
interpretations of the law. 52
Italy has a strong, independent judiciary, but this independence
has been achieved at the cost of efficiency and accountability. 53 To
increase judicial independence, evaluations of a judge’s performance
have been eliminated.54 The CSM has also put policies in place to
minimize outside supervision of judges. 55 As a result of this lack of
oversight, Italy’s judicial system is highly inefficient. In fact, Italy has
received by far the most monetary sanctions for failing to conclude
judicial proceedings in a reasonable time. 56 Italy is therefore a prime
example of a state that has revised their judicial structure in a way that
concentrates on judicial independence but disregards programs that
favor accountability. 57
3. Judicial Independence in England
England has what some consider the “hallmarks” of an
independent judiciary. 58 Judges in England are afforded “security of
tenure, fiscal independence, impartiality and freedom from executive
[power].” 59 Unlike other countries in Europe, England’s judicial
independence seems to be held in place by natural forces. For example,
the Lord Chancellor is not only the Head of the Judiciary but a
politician who serves in a major executive department. 60 However, this
relationship does not appear to be problematic. Also, judicial
impartiality seems to be maintained simply by “[t]he formality of
English law, a relatively small bar, a divided profession, and the orality
of English courtroom procedure.” 61

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

See Adenitire, supra note 33, at 14.
Id. at 15.
Seibert-Fohr, supra note 38, at 9.
Di Federico, supra note 50, at 9.
Id. at 10.
Id.
See id. at 9-10
Stevens, supra note 39, at 599.
Id.
Id. at 605-06.
Id. at 604.
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On a structural level, the English judiciary is not a co-equal branch
of government, as is the case in the United States. 62 The English
Constitution states that the judiciary is subordinate to Parliament.63
Parliament has the ability to make or end law and no future court
decision can change an existing law. 64 This type of relationship
between Parliament and the judiciary may limit the decision-making
ability of the judiciary. 65 On its face, this type of structure appears to
be similar to the structure found in communist countries, where the
government takes most if not all of the decision-making power away
from the judiciary. 66 However, in classic Parliamentary systems, as in
England and France, this dominant relationship does not exist.
Members of Parliament are popularly elected and contribute a range of
opinions, eliminating the risk that the judiciary is only attempting to
please a single party. 67
Despite England’s success at maintaining an independent
judiciary, they also have encountered several problems. In recent years,
there has been pressure on the government to create a more accountable
judicial system. 68 An increase in the demand for accountability has
been a result of increasing prevalence of judicial review and judicial
interference. There has also been a concern over the lack of women and
minorities in the judiciary, leading to allegations of bias appointment
procedures and a lack of impartiality. 69 As a result of these allegations,
radical reforms have taken place in England over the past decade.
Reforms included an act which abolished the Lord Chancellor position
and created a Judicial Appointments Commission which appoints
judges solely on the basis of merit. 70

62. Id. at 608.
63. Cristina E. Parau, Beyond Judicial Independence: What Kind of Judiciary is Emerging
in Post-Communist Eastern Europe? 4–5 (Dec. 10, 2009), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1523285 [https://perma.cc/J6MU-DVGE].
64. Parliamentary Sovereignty, WWW.PARLIAMENT.UK http://www.parliament.uk/about/
how/sovereignty/ [https://perma.cc/ZA8N-6VTA].
65. Parau, supra note 63, at 7.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 8.
68. Nuno Garoupa & Tom Ginsburg, Guarding the Guardians: Judicial Councils and
Judicial Independence, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 103, 116 (2009).
69. Id. at 117.
70. Id.
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C. China
China presents a contrasting example. Exploring its system assists
in two ways. This exploration enhances understanding of judicial
independence itself. And second, it illustrates the likely motivations of
the European Union and CoE when considering the judicial
independence system, it would insist upon for post-communist
aspirants in CEE.
In China, there is essentially no judicial independence from state
actors. The same was true in the Soviet Union and to varying degrees
in the communist times in CEE. 71 The lack of judicial independence
results from the application of law: both the law on judges and the law
on advocates assigns the highest duty of the lawyer or judge to the state,
in essence to the Communist Party of China. 72 Most judges, even
judges of the high courts, are not law-trained, but instead are state
actors who have risen through Party ranks or former military officers.
Their primary function is not to get the law right or do justice in a broad
meaning of that word, but to serve the paramount interests of the state
in deciding cases. This very simple structural feature creates a judicial
system lacking in independence from state actors. Such a system also
lacks any real accountability to the people of the country, but it ensures
the highest level of accountability to the state itself. Judges can be fined
or otherwise punished for making incorrect decisions (that is, decisions
reversed by higher courts). This last feature encourages conformity and
devotion to superiors.
It is well understood that in cases involving the state, at least cases
of some note or controversy, the judge is subject to the control of party
officials who “stand behind the curtain” in the courtroom. Ordinary
criminal defense lawyers in such cases operate as technicians, merely
ensuring that the proper process is followed, and restraining the
enthusiasm of their objections when procedure is not followed.
Ironically, and perhaps in a tribute to the never-ending
imagination of lawyers, the lack of meaningful judicial independence
in China has recently resulted in a fascinating technique now in use by
71. James Moliterno, The New-Breed, “Die-Hard” Chinese Lawyer: A Comparison with
American Civil Rights Cause Lawyers, 25 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. (forthcoming
2018).
72. Zhōnghuá rénmín gònghéguó lǜshī fǎ (yīngwén bǎn) [Law of the People’s Republic of
China on Lawyers], SINA, http://blog.sina.cn/dpool/blog/s/blog_634a1ecb0100sp3g.html
[https://perma.cc/BZ67-VKFH].
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an aggressive sliver of the criminal defense and civil rights bar. A new
breed of lawyer is practicing criminal defense in China. Dubbed the
“die-hard lawyer” by the press, but sometimes self-eschewing the label,
these new lawyers say they are simply representing their clients
zealously, advancing their interests by whatever legitimate means are
at hand. What is being said of them in the press? 73 What do they say
about themselves? 74
The die-hard lawyer is certainly more aggressive in the first
instance. He or she does all that the technically-oriented traditional
lawyer does, but also vigorously pursues arguments about the legality
of the prosecution’s evidence and methods. The die-hard lawyer
challenges judges’ rulings on evidence admission and procedural rights
and does so vociferously. And the die-hard lawyer does so even after it
is clear that the judge will not be permitted by others to rule in the
defense’s favor. But in addition to being more aggressive and more
persistent, the die-hard lawyer uses tactics that are outside the walls of
the courtroom and its procedures.
In particular, the die-hard lawyer uses social media as a tool of
advocacy, trying to create social pressure on the Party officials who
control the judges. During the Li Qinghong trial, an “all-star team” of
defense lawyers blanketed the Chinese social media with news of the
proceedings, commenting on everything from errors in the indictments
to the disparate volume of the defense and prosecution microphones.75
The media work was so intense that weibo (the Chinese version of
Facebook and Twitter, which are banned in China) updates were being
sent live from the courtroom by defense lawyers, and large segments
of the population were riveted to the news.
[L]awyers’ online activities can be traced back to the influential
case of Li Zhuang, a lawyer falsely prosecuted with perjury in
Chongqing, in 2010. While the voices of the official media
framing and blaming Li were dominating public opinion, the
73. Alexa Olesen, Meet China’s Swaggering, ‘Diehard’ Criminal Lawyers, FOREIGN
POL’Y (May 16, 2014), https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/05/16/meet-chinas-swaggering-diehardcriminal-lawyers/ [https://perma.cc/PP44-3S66]; Yueran Zhang, China’s All-Star Legal Team
Pleads for Defendants’ Rights on Social Media, TEALEAFNATION (July 25, 2012),
http://tealeafnation.com/2012/07/bilingual-brew-chinas-all-star-legal-team-pleads-fordefendants-rights-on-social-media [hereinafter All-Star Team].
74. In July 2014, Professor Moliterno met and interviewed two of the more prominent new
breed of Chinese lawyers.
75. All-Star Team, supra note 72.
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defense had no choice but to tell the other side of the story via
social media. 76

The Chinese die-hard lawyer’s use of social media is an effort to
combat raw power of those in control of the justice system, both judges
and so-called “higher-ups.” This use of social media to create public
pressure and possible embarrassment of “higher ups” seems odd to
some Americans, simply because such a technique would be so
unlikely of success in the U.S. Ironically, it is the lack of judicial
independence in China that makes the technique viable. The wellfounded expectation of Chinese criminal defense lawyers in high
profile cases is that judges are told what to do by people often referred
to as “higher ups.” These “higher ups” are party officials whose will is
being done by local judges and prosecutors. Such orders, while not
entirely unheard-of in an independent court system, are both rare and
most likely ineffectual. In such an independent court system, nothing
much would be gained in an individual case by generating public
opinion. But the taste of the Chinese public seems to have been whetted
for news of injustice, and the “higher ups,” while they wield mostly
unchecked power, do care about stirring the public ire. This is just the
trend and tendency that is being banked on by the die-hard lawyer in
the use of social media. The same phenomenon allows, but does not
ensure, that they will stay out of jail.
The battle has been joined between the die-hard lawyers and the
state. “These activist lawyers, who have wild intentions to challenge
and change the law, have deviated from what their jobs are supposed
to entail,” a state-oriented editorial said. The editorial leveled a warning
at the group, who must “realize that they are not commandos or the
authoritative forces behind improvements to rule of law in China.”77
Such challenges seem only to further embolden the die-hards and their
followers. A crackdown on July 9, 2015 (referred to as “709” by
activists as a sort of code in their social media communications) has
seriously undermined the strategy and restored the upper-hand to the
Party.
For purposes of this article, the important point is that to be
effective at enhancing or destroying judicial independence, systems
must be designed with the legal culture in mind, with the attributes of
76. All-Star Team, supra note 72.
77. Shan Renping, Legal Activists Must Also Respect Rule of Law, GLOBAL TIMES (May
8, 2014), http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/859107.shtml [https://perma.cc/6DJX-U482].
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the judges and lawyers in mind, and with attention to the balance
between independence and accountability. If one were to imagine a
hypothetical reform of the Chinese judicial system intended to move it
toward democratic principles and norms, it would be natural for such a
reform to over-emphasize judicial independence at the expense of
accountability. At first glance, a post-communist judiciary needs more
independence and less accountability (at least to state actors). This
appears to have been the mindset of EU CoE accession officials in
dealing with post-communist aspirant countries.
III. SOME BACKGROUND LEGAL HISTORY OF CENTRAL AND
EASTERN EUROPE (LAYING THE GROUNDWORK FOR WHY
THE EU-IMPOSED MODEL OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE WAS
SUCH A POOR FIT)
Much debate rages on what is meant by Central or Eastern Europe.
For this paper, the judicial independence concepts apply generally to
all post-communist EU entrants and aspirants. But the need to focus
forces a narrower approach. As a result, in particular, our attention is
on Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic and Slovakia (collectively, the
“Visegrad countries”). Their commonalities make them worthy of
common consideration and study. Before 1989, these four countries
were a part of the Eastern Bloc; after the Revolution, they became so
called post-soviet republics. By 2004, they became NATO and EU
members. The Visegrad countries have much in common because huge
political events of the twentieth century struck usually all of them
together. Finally, because of our specialized knowledge and
experience, we will focus on Slovakia more carefully as our example.
The results of strengthening judicial independence in the Visegrad
countries by Council of Europe and European Commission was not
what these organization might have expected in post-communist
countries of CEE.
Browsing through texts dealing with the judicial method and
mentality in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) at the onset of the
2004 enlargement of the European Union(EU), one acquired
a mixed feeling. The mandatory institutional optimism of the
various approximation and pre-accession reports stood in contrast
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with rather skeptical tones voiced in some of the scholarly
writings. 78

On the one hand, the CEE countries adopted laws that strengthen
the position of the judiciary and putting it into the position of an
independent branch of state power; but, on the other hand, judges in
these countries have never overcome the formalistic approach to law,
(characterized as textualism) which does not comply with recent
adjustments to the traditional European approach. By “recent”
European approach, we primarily mean the functioning of the
European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights,
both of which operate partially as common law courts. In other
respects, the Visegrad tendency toward formalism and textualism is not
much different from that in other civil law countries in continental
Europe.
Their world of formalist, textualist, hyper-positivistic law stood
worlds apart from the more dynamic and purpose-oriented reasoning
style required by European law. 79 It became clear that independence is
not only about structural, institutional separation, but mostly about an
attitude of all judges or politicians toward an independent judiciary.
This mental, attitudinal transition from formalism under the
control of state actors to a more flexible, purpose-driven judging did
not happen. Changes to legislation in the CEE focused on the formal
institutional framework but underestimated the personnel at the courts.
Problems that are simple to solve on paper, by adopting legislation that
would set the structure of the new regime, proved far more challenging
to solve in reality because of the existing ideology, reasoning, and
conviction of nearly all of the judges in the system. “The area of
genuinely important change, the mental transition of the Central
European judiciary from a caste of secure and subservient civil servants
to personally and mentally independent and critical judges who are
ready to make and (publicly) defend their opinions, has mostly been
outside of the mainstream focus.” 80
78. MICHAL BOBEK, Revisiting the Transformative Power of Europe, in CENTRAL
EUROPEAN JUDGES UNDER THE INFLUENCE: TRANSFORMATIVE POWER OF THE EU REVISITED
13 (Hart Publishing 2015).
79. Id. at 14 (‘“We shall overcome with the help from Europe’ rhetoric became intertwined
with scary images of CEE post-Communist judges that were depicted as limited formalists who
seek refuge in the realms of mechanical jurisprudence and senseless sticking to procedures.
Afraid to decide on substance and to pass any controversial judgments, they seek to dispose of
cases on obscure points of procedure, in the observance of which they are very meticulous.”).
80. Bobek, The Fortress of Judicial Independence, supra note 35, at 100.
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An authoritarian regime is like a refrigerator. It can slow down all
the processes in the society. But when the refrigerator stops working,
everything starts to rot much faster. CEE was not ready for such
a dramatic change from a judiciary totally dependent on instruction and
control from the state to a judiciary almost entirely independent of state
or public oversight. Of course, how could the states be ready for
judicial independence when the judges’ entire experience had been in
a system that required all political activities to conform to the interests
of the communist party?
A. History of Judiciary of CEE Countries
As demonstrated by the previous discussions of European judicial
independence systems, the local legal culture and history of
government systems assist an evaluation of what judicial independence
system may be most successful. To understand the difficulties of the
180-degree swing from total dependency of judicial power on
government in authoritarian regime to excessive independence
according to the model proposed by the organizations of the CoE and
the EU, it is helpful to have background on roots and legal traditions in
CEE. Without the background, proposed solutions will lack grounding
and context.
Before 1918, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic were
a part of Austro-Hungarian Empire. 81 After World War I, the Austrian
and Hungarian law were adopted by the newborn legal systems in
Czechoslovakia. 82 Of course, the old systems had to be adjusted to fit
the post-war, post-monarchy democratic institutions. 83 Although the
Austrian and Hungarian Law was condemned as “foreign,” legal
culture was highly honored by lawyers until the communist coup in
1948. 84 The monarchy developed a complex system of bureaucracy, an
81. As were small parts of Poland.
82. In Czechoslovakia it was adopted by Act. No. 11/1918 Coll. The situation was very
particular, because of two different legal systems in two parts of the country. In Czech, part of
the Austrian laws from before 1918 were adopted, and in Slovakia the Hungarian laws from
before 1918 were adopted. This dualism was not solved until the communist coup in 1948.
83. A notoriously famous quote of the first president of the Czechoslovak Republic,
Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk, explains a lot: “Now we have a democracy, what we also need are
democrats.”
84. Paradoxically, it is now the 100th anniversary of the event when we stood at the
crossroad of history, facing the problem of adopting a framework for institutions that we were
not familiar with.
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independent judiciary and sophisticated legal culture. The successor
states of the Austro-Hungarian Empire inherited from the bureaucratic
Habsburg State a deep confidence in written law. 85 Members of the
judiciary were traditionally a privileged group. In 1918, this privilege
is demonstrated in a matter of the location of the Supreme Court when
Prague was initially designated as the home of Supreme Court, but
Brno (the second largest town in the central part and much nearer to
Vienna) became its location. At first blush, it might appear that the
Czechoslovak legislature wanted to secure the independence of the
court by moving it out of the capital, Prague; but the real reason for this
move was that judges who served in Vienna until 1918 and who were
of Czech origin did not want to move to Prague, which was far away
from Vienna. 86
Because of the different timeline in all of the CEE countries, we
focus on Czechoslovakia as the example to explain the position of the
judiciary in the authoritarian regime. During WWII, Czechoslovakia
lost many judges. Some were lost because they were Jewish and were
either taken away by Nazi occupiers or fled. Others left the judiciary
because their beliefs could not be conformed to the requirements of
being a judge in a fascist state.87 Following World War II,
Czechoslovakia went from one authoritarian regime under the
occupation of Nazi Germany to another, only changing the occupier to
the Soviet Union. Under the influence of the Soviet laws, new
institutions were adopted, such as non-law-trained people as judges,88
retribution courts were established, 89 and the qualification of the judge

85. ZDENĚK KÜHN, THE JUDICIARY IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE: MECHANICAL
JURISPRUDENCE IN TRANSFORMATION 4, 9 (2011) (“Czechoslovak judges, despite the
prevailing atmosphere that was generally hostile to the old Empire gave high praise to the
distinguished legal culture, independence and efficiency of the Austrian judiciary.”)
86. In Act No. 5/1918 Coll., which created the Supreme Court, Prague is claimed to be the
residence of the Court. See Otakar Motejl, Soudnictví a jeho správa [Judiciary in Communism
and Its Administration], in KOMUNISTICKÉ PARVO V ČESKOSLOVENSKU [COMMUNIST LAW IN
CZECHOSLOVAKIA] 813 (Michal Bobek et al. eds., 2009).
87. Id. at 814.
88. Until 1948 it was common in Czechoslovakia to have jury trials in criminal
proceedings as the lay instrument.
89. Act on Popularization of the Judiciary, Act No. 319/1948 Coll. As the Act on the
Popularization of the Judiciary was adopted in 1948, the composition of the Supreme Court was
completed by appointing a required number of lay judges. The panels were made up of two
professional judges and three lay judges. See Kühn, supra note 85, at 32.
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became devotion and loyalty to the state. 90 When deciding a case, their
votes were equal. The lay judges even took part in decisions on
complaints of the violation of law. Because the lay judges were
appointed by the government, the principles of impartiality and
independence were seriously violated. The first obligation of the courts
was to acquire political and ideological character in order to protect the
socialistic state, socialistic society and relations to the world socialistic
structure. 91
The early 1950s are notoriously known for the “Monster trials”92
and also for a huge crisis of the judiciary. After WWII, Czechoslovakia
lost one-third of the educated elite. 93 Popular lay-judges were either
illiterate or political fanatics. 94 Even though there were some judges
who finished regular law schools in Prague or Bratislava, the
administration of the courts was always in hands of the nominees of the
Party. The judiciary in this period was strongly politicized. The
selection of new judges was also under political influence, 95 because of

90. An application to the Communist Party could prove this devotion. In 1949, the Labour
Schools of Law were opened and the loyalty to the Communist Party with the “right” political
attitude became a stronger requirement than the competence of the judge.
91. Act on Popularization of the Judiciary, supra note 89, at ¶ 11.
92. Political trials: Also known as “Show Trials”– the political trials in which the judicial
authorities have already determined the guilt of the defendant in advance. The actual trial has as
its only goal to present the accusation and the verdict to the public as an impressive example and
as a warning to other would-be dissidents or transgressors. The law in these trials represented
a state ideology. The judge, the prosecution and the defense were acting on behalf of the
government. These political trials were a sign of a subordination of the Czechoslovakian
government to Soviet power. Among many trials, the most known are the trials of Rudolf
Slánský and Milada Horáková, which demonstrate that the trials were conducted not only against
“children of the revolution,” the topic of Slanský’s case, but also against active opponents of the
Communist Party, such as the trial of Milada Horáková shows. See Kühn, supra note 85, at 26–
27.
93. MÁRIA M. KOVÁCS, LIBERAL PROFESSIONALS AND ILLIBERAL POLITICS, HUNGARY
FROM THE HABSBURGS TO THE HOLOCAUST xix (1964). In comparison, Poland lost even more:
From 7980 lawyers before WWII, fifty-seven percent did not survive the war, and from 5171
judges before the war, 1110 did not survive. See RZEPLINSKI, A. DIE JUSTIZ IN DER
VOLKSREPUBLIK POLEN 30 (1996). Zdeněk Kühn, Socialistická Justice [Socialist Judiciary], in
KOMUNISTICKÉ PARVO V ČESKOSLOVENSKU [COMMUNIST LAW IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA] 824
(Michal Bobek et al. eds., 2009).
94. Very often, these lay-judges did not finish high school. OTO ULČ, THE JUDGE IN
A COMMUNIST STATE: A VIEW FROM WITHIN 9 (1972).
95. Act. No. 36/1957 Coll. ¶ 2 (election of the judges for the period of three years),
followed by Act. No. 36/1964 Coll. ¶ 39 (for four years), and finally Act No. 156/1969 Coll. ¶
40 (prolonging the period to ten years).

510

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 42:2

the idea of the popular judiciary. 96 Judges were elected by political
bodies—National Council or local party committees, 97 and nominated
by the National Front. 98 The argument was often presented that the layjudge might be even better in deciding legal issues, because the law
should be clear to laymen as well. The lay-judges were also assigned
to the surveillance of the professional judges. 99 The notion of
independence was completely different from the meaning of
independence in democracy. The Constitution of the Czechoslovak
Socialistic Republic from 1960 claimed to safeguard the independence
of the judiciary, including courts and judges, to some extent, at least on
paper. Yet it is clear from various testimonials that such independence
existed to a very limited extent, and in politically-relevant cases was
virtually non-existent. Even if “in about ninety percent of the court
agenda there was not the slightest sign of interference in our decisionmaking,” this “does not warrant the conclusion that ninety percent
judicial independence and integrity existed.” 100 Subordination to the
party interests, cloaked as the interests of the people, and the interests
of its powerful members existed because of “the awareness that
someone might at any time inflict his ‘suggestion’ upon us, conditioned
all our adjudication.” 101 This form of independence was just an
instrumental requirement obligating the judge to honor official state
policy and the Party. 102
Moreover, the phenomenon of “telephone justice” was well
known across the former Communist Bloc, albeit in its local
mutations. 103 “Telephone justice” refers to informal instructions on
how to decide particular cases of interest to the ruling elites of the
communist party and was based on informal (oral) commands, rather
96. Constitution art. 98, No. 100/1960 Coll.
97. Act on Election of Judges ¶ 2-5, 36/1957 Coll.
98. During the Communist Era in Czechoslovakia (1948–1989), National Front was the
vehicle for control of all political and social activity by the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia.
These elections were just confirmation of Party candidates.
99. KÁLMAN KULCSÁR, PEOPLE’S ASSESSORS IN THE COURTS: A STUDY ON SOCIOLOGY
OF LAW 37 (1982). In the 1950s there were ten times more lay-judges in the judiciary than
professional judges, and seventy percent of them were members of the Communist Party. Kühn,
supra note 96, at 828.
100. ULČ, supra note 94 at 61.
101. Id.
102. MIRJAN R. DAMASKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY:
A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THE LEGAL PROCESS 173 (1986).
103. Alena Ledeneva, Telephone Justice in Russia, 24 POST SOVIET AFF. 324, 350 (2008).
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than formal documented commands, indicating the degree of
discretion, web of mutual favors and non-transparency: A manifest
function of such unwritten rules at every level is to preserve discretion
and to achieve additional control and manageability on the basis of
informal leverage in order to purse declared goals. The latent function,
however, is to distinguish between insiders and outsiders and to benefit
the insiders along the lines of “for friends we have everything, for
enemies we have law.” 104
As Ledeneva points out, such behavior, seen through the lens of
judicial independence, must nowadays be understood as a form of
corruption. 105 Telephone justice indicates that judges may have been
victims of the encroaching executive power “in the name of the
working people,” but it also posits that judges could be self-interested
agents seeking self-empowerment through interaction and
collaboration with the ruling elites or powerful actors. Thus, while the
general presupposition of judicial independence is critical to upholding
the rule of law, the concept needs to be operationalized within the
context of certain social and cultural frameworks developed over
decades. 106 A well-designed, but mechanistic approach to judicial
independence would not necessarily yield reliable and desirable results.
In the 1960’s, “the mortification of the state,” as the Marxist
theory called the outcome of the Marxist revolution, was happening:
the number of the courts and judges was reduced and the judiciary was
shrinking. 107 The quality of the judiciary was very low, mainly because
the intensive political influence, unqualified judges, and ideologically
focused law schools. In 1968, during “Prague Spring,” things slowly
started to improve, for instance, by rehabilitation of judges who had
been dismissed from the bench because of their political opinions.
Qualitative requirements for the judges improved, and lay-judges were
104. Id. at 330.
105. Id.
106. One anecdote from the so-called normalization of the communist regime after
liberalization of the year 1968 is telling: the communist party was undertaking cleansing of the
local units of the party, whereas basically all of the units were expected to name some internal
enemy within the party. Some of the, mainly Slovak, units of the party did not meet the
expectation, claiming there was simply no internal enemy within their particular circles. Clearly,
the internal cohesion of such units was very strong.
107. Jiří Příbáň, Na stráži Jednoty Světa: Marxismus a Právní Teorie [On The Guard of
Unity of the World: Marxism and Legal Theory], in KOMUNISTICKÉ PRAVO V
ČESKOSLOVENSKU [COMMUNIST LAW IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA] 47 (Michal Bobek et al. eds.,
2009).
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banned in higher courts. But this improvement did not last long. Since
1969 and through 1970’s, the process called “normalization” started
and continued. Most of the reforms of the Prague Spring were stopped
and reform judges were banned from the bench again. The position of
the judge completely lost the social dignity it had enjoyed fifty years
before. Low salaries in the judiciary meant that courts did not
experience a rush of the candidates for this position. Because of low
interest for the job among men, women could apply for it. Thanks to
this paradox, the judiciary in CEE countries is one of the professions
that first reached gender equality. 108
Law became a flexible instrument of social engineering, instead
of functioning as a normative system. For instance, the constitutions
from 1948 and 1960 were not respected in practice, since although they
guaranteed certain checks and balances, the power was concentrated in
the hands of communist elites. Hence the rule of law had mutated into
the rule of the party. 109
B. After 1989
After the revolutions in 1989 many judges left the judiciary, either
willfully because they sought private practice its financial rewards or
because of the threat of “lustration process.” Lustration was supposed
to prevent the former agents or collaborationists of the secret service of
the communist state, leaders of Communist Party, and graduates of
Soviet ideological universities from entering the government,
administration, military, public media and public companies
established by the government. It yielded very different outcomes in
CEE countries.
For example, in Czechoslovakia the National Assembly adopted
the law on lustration 110 for particular government positions. Hungary
did the same. In both countries, there was a complaint that these laws
are unconstitutional. While on the one hand, the Czechoslovak

108. See Rzeplinski, supra note 96, at 64 (42% women on the bench in Hungary (1980),
50% in DDR (1980), and 55% in Poland (1986)); ULRIKE SHAW, WOMEN IN WORLD’S LEGAL
PROFESSIONS 323 (Gisela Schulz & Ulrike Shaw eds., 2003); Kühn, supra note 96, at 846.
109. MICHAL BOBEK, KOMUNISTICKÉ PRAVO V ČESKOSLOVENSKU [COMMUNIST LAW IN
CZECHOSLOVAKIA] (Pavel Molek & Vojtěch Šimíček eds., 2009).
110. Act No. 451/1991 Coll.
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Constitutional Court decided 111 that it complies with principles of rule
of law to adopt such a law to build a just system, the Hungarian
Constitutional Court 112 decided in the opposite way.
There were essentially two approaches, the application of
lustration but without strict enforcement or a complete omission of
lustration. The common criticism of the two approaches is that the postcommunist countries did not prevent the transformation of the
previously elite groups from the old regime into the elites of the new
regime: the same people who were in power before 1989 turned into
the post-1989 elites with essentially the same power, thanks to
connections, intelligence, and information they could use. 113
Judicial independence has had trouble developing in CEE. Under
communist regimes, judicial independence and separation of powers
were nonexistent and judges were considered loyal servants to the party
in power. 114 After the fall of communism in the late 1980s, states in
CEE sought to form independent and democratic governments, using
governments in the West as a guide. Poland, for example, based their

111. Decision of Constitutional Court of ČSFR Pl. ÚS 1/92 (Nov. 26, 1992) (“Unlike a
totalitarian system based on immediate purpose and never linked to legal principles, the less the
constitutional and democratic principles are based on completely different values and criteria.
Each State, much less the one who was forced to suffer more than 40 years of fundamental rights
violations by totalitarian power, has the right to establish a democratic establishment, to apply
also legal measures aimed at averting the risk of subversion, the possible recurrence of
totalitarianism, or at least their limitation. Legal certainty must be the certainty of its content
values. The now-established rule of law, which is based on value discontinuity with the
totalitarian regime, cannot therefore accept criteria based on a different system of values.
Respecting continuity with the old system of values of the previous law would not, therefore, be
a guarantee of legal certainty, but would, on the contrary, jeopardize the values of new ones,
jeopardize legal certainty in society, and shake the confidence of the citizen in the credibility of
the democratic system”).
112. Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] no. 11/1992 (contending that the
change of the system is based on legality). The principle of legality requires the constitutional
government to demand that the rules of the rule of law be fully applied. Political changes were
made in a procedurally flawless manner, according to the rules of the old regime, including the
legislative process, thereby preserving the binding force of these old legal norms. The old law
retained its validity. Fundamental requirements of the constitutional state cannot be eliminated
by reference to the historical situation and the requirement of justice in the rule of law. The rule
of law cannot be based on the weakening of the rule of law. Legal certainty is more important
than necessarily partial and subjective injustice.
113. ZOBEC, J. CERNIC, J.L, CENTRAL EUROPEAN JUDGES UNDER THE INFLUENCE:
TRANSFORMATIVE POWER OF THE EU REVISITED 135 (Michal Bobek ed., 2015).
114. Parau, supra note 63 at 14–15.
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governmental structure off of the model found in the United States by
establishing three separate and equal branches of government. 115
Some post-Communist states sought to develop an independent
judiciary based on its forms in Western Europe. Others have been
forced to develop independent judiciaries by external forces. For
example, international organizations that award grants and loans to
states require the state to establish a government with an independent
judiciary and adopt the rule of law. 116 Similarly, countries seeking
accession into the European Union were pushed toward the
establishment of a strong judiciary as a condition of acceptance. 117
The establishment of judicial independence in CEE has been
challenging. 118 Post-communist states must develop a strong,
independent judiciary where a few short decades ago the concept was
nonexistent. Many judges still lack the confidence to think for
themselves while society still sees judges as corrupt and inefficient
servants of state interests or their own interests. Further, many
governmental structures these states have adopted from the West fail
to take into account the region’s unique historical and cultural
problems.
One of the major problems countries in this region face is a
judiciary comprised of magistrates who remain loyal to communist
notions of the “proper” role of the judiciary. 119 The judicial culture in
Eastern Europe embodies the perception that judges are simply “wellpaid civil servants.” 120 Judges see themselves as a “subservient
technocrats” who lack the confidence to make judicial decisions on
their own. 121 Although judiciaries in these regions have achieved some
sort of structural independence they still lack mentally independent
judges. 122 Even more problematic is the development of bureaucratic
structures that encourage this subservient mindset. For example, in the
Czech Republic, judicial appointment begins with the psychological
testing of candidates in order to weed out those who may deviate from
115. Markus B. Zimmer, Judicial Independence in Central and East Europe: The
Institutional Context, 14 TULSA J. COMP. & INTL. L. 53, 58 (2006).
116. Parau, supra note 63, at 15.
117. Id.
118. Bobek, The Fortress of Judicial Independence, supra note 35.
119. Id. at 2.
120. Id. at 8.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 10.
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the norm. 123 This type of system forces judges to become subservient
to the legislature and does not allow them to think critically on their
own. 124 It fosters the same type of judicial culture that was found in
communist Europe. But now, there is no communist party to direct the
conduct of judges. And the powerful structures of independence mean
the state lacks significant control. Instead, judges are largely under the
control of superior judges.
Not only do judges see themselves as humble civil servants, the
perception of a subservient judiciary persists among many politicians
and citizens in post-communist Europe. 125 This perception has
contributed to public distrust of judges which in turn has inhibited
states’ efforts to reduce corruption. 126 During the accession period,
several states seeking accession into the European Union (e.g.,
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and
Slovakia) showed evidence of widespread corruption. The lack of
political and public trust led to a lack of support for reforms that could
strengthen judicial independence. In fact, recent laws have been
implemented to increase judicial accountability while decreasing
independence. In Bulgaria, for example, a law has been proposed which
would abolish a judges’ right to appeal disciplinary rulings. 127 In the
Czech Republic, Lithuania, and Hungary, stricter screening measures
for judges were implemented partially because of the public distrust of
judges. 128
Another problem states in the CEE face is establishing a
governmental structure sympathetic to the region’s unique political
history. Many of the states in this region have adopted models of
governmental structure found in continental Western Europe.129
However, looking uncritically toward the West for a proper
government model may be problematic. Local culture must be
considered in system design. States in the West have had a long time
to develop the proper balance between judicial independence and
123. Id. at 8.
124. Id. at 8.
125. EU ACCESSION MONITORING PROGRAM, OPEN SOCIETY INSTITUTE, MONITORING
THE EU ACCESSION PROCESS: JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 22 (Cent. Eur. Univ. Press 2001).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Zimmer, supra note 115, at 61.
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judicial accountability. 130 In contrast, states in the CEE are still trying
to find the right way to transfer judicial oversight from the executive to
the judiciary. 131 These states have also had major problems with
establishing a sustainable amount of judicial independence.
In some CEE states, the executive still retains significant control
over the judiciary. Modeled after the continental European structure,
these states have created ministries of justice or councils comprised of
members of the judicial, legislative, and executive branches with
significant managerial control over the judiciary. 132 The executive
retains significant power over the judiciary through appointments,
influence on oversight committees and budget control. 133 Although
retention of power over the judiciary by the executive is not uncommon
in Europe, this relationship may be troublesome in historically
communist countries, where the judiciary was once completely
subservient to the executive.
In other states the judiciary has been given too much
independence. CEE states have tried to strengthen judicial
independence by the creation of independent judicial councils like
those found in Western Europe. The purpose of judicial councils is to
prevent interference with judicial function from the power of the other
branches. 134 But what has emerged in some CEE states is a judiciary so
completely independent that accountability is almost non-existent.
IV. WHAT DID EUROPEAN UNION AND COUNCIL OF EUROPE
DEMAND OF NEW ENTRANTS?
A. The European Union Accession Criteria
Judiciary and its improvement were not much discussed before
1990. Occasionally some documents like UN Basic Principles135
adopted by the UN General Assembly and the Bangalore Principles of

130. Id. at 62.
131. Id. at 61.
132. Id.
133. EU ACCESSION MONITORING PROGRAM, supra note 125.
134. Bobek, supra note 35, at 4.
135. Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, endorsed by G.A. Res. 40/32
(Nov. 29, 1985) and G.A. Res. 40/146 (Dec. 13, 1985).
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Judicial Conduct 136 emerged as international articulations of very
general principles of judicial structure and conduct. But overall, the
qualities of the judiciary was not a topic of serious discussion.
In Europe, unlike in the United Nations, the process of principles
of court administration went much further and deeper. As Michal
Bobek and David Kosař mention, the process divides into two periods:
from 1950’s until early 1990’s, neither the European Union nor
Council of Europe paid significant attention to the models of court
administration. 137 However, in 1993, with the adoption of the EU
Copenhagen criteria, developed and agreed upon during the European
Council meeting in Copenhagen, the topic of court administration and
organization became a significant focus in the ensuing EU accession
process and the setting of condition vis-a-vis the candidate countries.138
Ever since, judicial independence is seen as a critical element of
the rule of law and as one of the core values of the European Union.139
Judicial independence is required to effectively limit the exercise of
state power over the judiciary. By protecting judicial decision-making
from interference by state actors, judicial independence protects the
rights and freedoms of individuals. The single market could not
function without comparable and reliable judicial protection in the
respective member states. Moreover, the effectiveness of common
rules at the EU level should not be burdened by the fact that certain
governments do not embrace the foundational elements of the Union.
Member states should be free to negotiate and deal with states with
comparable freedom and respect towards democracy and the rule of
law when agreeing on detailed binding laws on majoritarian terms. The
EU is a political entity, whose members implicitly share common

136. Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct, adopted by the Judicial Group on
Strengthening Judicial Integrity (2002).
137. Cristina E. Parau, The Drive for Judicial Supremacy, JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN
TRANSITION 619 (Anja Seibert-Fohr ed., 2012). Bobek & Kosař, supra note 36, at 168.
138. Parau, supra note 137; Bobek & Kosař, supra note 36, at 168.
139. These are listed in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union, i.e. the so-called
“Homogeneity Clause,” which stipulates the core shared values of the member states and states
vowing for the EU candidacy: “The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity,
freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights
of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society
in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between
women and men prevail.”
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values. Thus, it was clear that an independent judiciary was one of the
critical aspects of the association criteria. 140
The European Union explicitly states that integration is founded
on shared values, including the rule of law. 141 European states may
apply to become a member of the Union, once they fulfill the criterion
of respecting the core EU values. 142 Although Article 2 of the Treaty
on European Union mentions the core principles, the interpretation and
application of the provision on accession to the Union have been
instable and subject to the actual enlargement policies.143 Further
specifications of the criteria are included within the Copenhagen
political criteria. 144
Membership requires that the candidate country achieve stability
of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights
and respect for and protection of minorities. Membership also requires
the existence of a functioning market economy, and the capacity to
cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union.
Membership presupposes the candidate’s ability to take on the
obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political,
economic and monetary union. 145
In a series of analytical papers, country reports and other countryrelevant documents, the criteria were further described and broken
down into parameters, although the wide scope of these documents and
papers left them necessarily vague and open to conflicting
interpretations. This vague and open wording led to high degree of
discretion by the Commission, who is their main interpreter, which in
turn led to confusion and double standards applied during the accession
140. VLADIMÍR BILČÍK, EÚ-MONITORING: PRÍSTUPOVÝ PROCES SLOVENSKA
A IMPLIKÁCIE PRE POLITICKÉ INŠTITÚCIE, PRÁVNY ŠTÁTU A REGIONÁLNU POLITIKU
[ACCESSION OF SLOVAKIA AND IMPLICATIONS FOR POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS, RULE OF LAW
AND REGIONAL POLITICS] (2004).

141. Presidency Conclusions of the Tampere European Council on 15 and 16 October
1999, EUR. PARLIAMENT (Oct. 15-16, 199), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits
/tam_en.htm [https://perma.cc/5TFG-XEYE].
142. Treaty on European Union art. 49.
143. SUSANNA FORTUNATO, THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION: A COMMENTARY 1358
(Hermann-Josef Blanke & Stelio Mangiameli eds., 2013).
144. Additional criteria of administrative capacity were added in 1995 by the Madrid
European Council.
145. Presidency Conclusions of the Copenhagen European Council on June 21 and 22,
1993,
EUR.
PARLIAMENT
(June
21-22,
1993),
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21225/72921.pdf [https://perma.cc/SNX9-6VH3].

2018]

EU POLICY TOWARD EUROPEAN ENTRANTS

519

procedures and progress evaluations. 146 Structural analysis of the
Copenhagen criteria and related documents help identify critical
components of the core elements of democracy and the rule of law, as
they were assessed by the Commission and the Council during the
accession procedures in late 1990s and early 2000s: (i) elections, (ii)
the functioning of the legislature, (iii) the functioning of the judiciary,
(iv) the functioning of the executive, and (v) anti-corruption measures
(good governance). 147
Most of the criteria remained a challenge for all of the candidate
countries from the CEE region, although their performance in
individual criteria varied greatly. In the criterion of functioning
judiciary, a host of features and elements were supposed to be complied
with.
[T]he judiciary should be independent, well-staffed and welltrained, well-paid, efficient, respected and accessible to people.
The self-governance of it should be real, including the noninterference of the other branches of power in the training of
judges in a special Judicial Institute, the work of their selfgoverning bodies and their appointment, as well as the work of
courts. The Lithuanian Constitutional Court ruling which found
that some powers of the Ministry of Justice of the republic in the
administering of justice contradicted the Constitution (Jarašiunas
et al. 2003, 588) was welcomed by the Commission and mentioned
in the 2000 Regular Report. The budget of the judiciary should
also be largely in the hands of the judges. The Reports also
demonstrate that lowering of the judges’ salaries is a breach of
judicial independence: 2002 Lithuanian Report regards the
Lithuanian Constitutional Court’s decision on prohibition of
lowering of salaries of judges as a positive development (2002
Lithuanian Report, 23). 148

Interestingly, the Commission’s reports on individual countries’
performance in achieving judicial independence in the pre-accession
period are inconsistent. While the Commission favorably assessed
mandatory re-trainings of Estonian judges, it remained neutral on the
146. Eline De Ridder & Dimitry Kochenov, Democratic Conditionality in Eastern
Enlargement: Ambitious Window Dressing, 16 EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 589 (2011).
147. Dimitry Kochenov, Behind the Copenhagen Façade. The Meaning and Structure of
the Copenhagen Political Criterion of Democracy and the Rule of Law, 8 EUR. INTEGRATION
ONLINE PAPERS 1 (2004).
148. Id. at 20.
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apparent conflict between the principle of independence and “an urgent
necessity to improve the training of the judiciary” in case of Czech
Republic, where the constitutional court found compulsory trainings
incompatible with independence. 149 The reports also did not give clear
guidance on what the evaluation on “the uniform methods and criteria,
not interfering with the independence of the judiciary” meant. The
inconsistency is also manifested in the fact that strong, structural
judicial independence from the executive was not necessarily a
prerequisite of the EU membership. 150 Czech Republic has never
adopted an independent council representing the formally independent
judiciary, yet its score in substantial judicial independence is superior
to those of the rest of the CEE countries entering the EU in 2000s, with
notable exception of Estonia. 151
The Copenhagen criteria and their operationalization in the
Commission’s reports lacked consistency and comparability across the
candidate countries, as “the demands [the Commission was] sending to
the candidate countries were often contradictory and almost entirely
unpredictable.” 152 “[It is] clear that the candidate countries’ readiness
to meet the initial political criteria was a political question on the EU
side, rather than a result of any more or less serious assessment.” 153
The European framework for achieving common standards and
approaches to the judiciary includes the EU’s consultative body on the
judiciary called The European Network of Councils for the Judiciary
(“ENCJ”), which periodically submits reports on condition of
judiciaries in member states of the EU and proposes lock-step
improvements of institutional structure. 154 ENCJ works with financial
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id. at 21.
Spáč, supra note 10, at 14–15.
Id.
De Ridder & Kochenov, supra note 146, at 9.
Id.
See generally EUROPEAN NETWORK OF COUNCILS FOR THE JUDICIARY (ENCJ),
COUNCILS FOR THE JUDICIARY REPORT 2010-2011 (2011), available at
https://www.encj.eu/images/stories/pdf/workinggroups/report_project_team_councils_for_the
_judiciary_2010_2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/MLW6-8SDT]; EUROPEAN NETWORK OF
COUNCILS FOR THE JUDICIARY (ENCJ), INDEPENDENCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE
JUDICIARY
2013-2014
(2014),
available
at
https://www.encj.eu/images/stories/
pdf/workinggroups/independence/encj_report_independence_accountability_adopted_version_
sept_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/SZW8-XDBY]; EUROPEAN NETWORK OF COUNCILS FOR THE
JUDICIARY (ENCJ), DISTILLATION OF ENCJ PRINCIPLES, RECOMMENDATIONS AND
GUIDELINES 2004-2017 (2017), available at https://www.encj.eu/images/stories/pdf/
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support of the European Commission. It consists of national institutions
in the member states of the European Union which are independent of
the executive and legislature and which are responsible for the support
of the judiciaries in the independent delivery of justice.
Moreover, the Council of Europe, although politically far less
significant than the EU and its structures and institutions, has its own
consultative institution called Consultative Council of European
Judges, which is devoted to contributing to implementation of the
Framework Global Action Plan for Judges in Europe. It has an advisory
function on general questions relating to independence, impartiality
and competence of judges. 155
Another consultative body related to the CoE is the European
Commission for the Efficiency of Justice. The Commission develops
concrete measures and tools aimed at policy makers and judicial
practitioners in order to analyze the functioning of judicial systems and
orientate public policies of justice. 156 Their goals are to have a better
knowledge of judicial timeframes and optimize judicial time
management, to promote the quality of the public service of justice, and
to facilitate the implementation of European standards and support
member states in their reform of court organization. 157
The CoE and EU have required the creation of a clear separation
of powers, with guardian being the institution at the top of the judiciary.
workinggroups/encj_distillation_report_2004_2017.pdf;
[https://perma.cc/W24F-CYZT];
EUROPEAN NETWORK OF COUNCILS FOR THE JUDICIARY (ENCJ), INDEPENDENCE,
ACCOUNTABILITY AND QUALITY OF THE JUDICIARY (2017), available at
https://www.encj.eu/images/stories/pdf/workinggroups/independence/encj_report_ia_ga_
adopted_ga_13_6.pdf [https://perma.cc/UVL3-495R].
155. For documents of the Consultative Council of European Judges (“CCJE”), see
Framework Global Action Plan for Judges in Europe, CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL OF EUR.
JUDGES (Feb. 12, 2001), https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/
DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=0900001680657eee
[https://perma.cc/57EL-HX8A];
European Charter on the statute for judges, COUNCIL OF EUR. (July 8-10, 1998),
https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=
090000168068510f [https://perma.cc/TWD9-GQ85].
156. See generally Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12 of the Committee of Ministers to
member states on judges: independence, efficiency and responsibilities, Council of Europe
Portal (Nov. 17, 2010), https://search.coe.int/cm/Pages/result_details.aspx?ObjectID=
09000016805afb78 [https://perma.cc/LUW2-JW2N]; COUNCIL OF EUROPE EUROPEAN
COMMISSION
FOR
THE
EFFICIENCY
OF
JUSTICE
(CEPEJ),
https://www.coe.int/T/dghl/cooperation/cepej/default_en.asp [https://perma.cc/KW54-8LWW]
[hereinafter CEPEJ].
157. See generally Framework Global Action Plan, supra note 155; CEPEJ, supra note
156.
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The independence of judges, in a globalized and interdependent
society, should be regarded by every citizen as a guarantee of truth,
freedom, respect for human rights, and impartial justice free from
external influence. The independence of judges is not a prerogative
or privilege granted in their own interest, but in the interest of the
rule of law and of anyone seeking and expecting justice.
Independence as a condition of judges’ impartiality therefore
offers a guarantee of citizens’ equality before the courts. 158

In the 1990s, different states endorsed different structures
safeguarding the independence of the judiciary, and the CoE did not
force states to change those systems that worked. “However, over the
years CoE lost the flexibility and became a strong advocate of Judicial
Council model.” 159 The eventual creation “of the Council of Judiciary
Euro-model presents a puzzle.” 160 “Neither the EU nor the CoE have
ever laid down any normative underpinnings of this model.” 161 Both of
the organizations simply internalized the recommendations of various
judicial consultative bodies, without addressing or assessing their
content.
Bobek and Kosař provide a list of five key requirements of the
judicial council Euro-model, which they gathered from numerous
organs and affiliated bodies of the EU and the CoE; there appears to be
some consensus on these requirements in Europe:
1)

A judicial council should have constitutional status. 162

2) At least 50 per cent of the members of the judicial council
must be judges and these judicial members must be selected by
their peers, that is by other judges. 163
3) A judicial council ought to be vested with decision-making
and not merely advisory powers. 164

158. Opinion no. 10, Consultative Council of European Judges (CCJE), ¶ 9 (2007).
159. Bobek & Kosař, supra note 36, at 161.
160. Id. at 169.
161. Id. at 161.
162. ENCJ, Councils for the Judiciary Report 2010-2011, supra note 154, at ¶ 1.4; CCJE,
Opinion no. 10 ¶ 11 (2007).
163. ENCJ, Councils for the Judiciary Report 2010-2011, supra note 154, at ¶ 2.1; CCJE,
Opinion. No. 10 ¶ 18 (2007).
164. ENCJ, Councils for the Judiciary Report 2010-2011, supra note 154, at ¶ 3.4; CCJE,
Opinion no.10 ¶¶ 48, 49, 60 (2007).
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4) A judicial council should have substantial competences in all
matters concerning the career of a judge including selection,
appointment, promotion, transfer, dismissal and disciplining. 165
5) A judicial council must be chaired either by the President or
Chief Justice of the highest court or the neutral head of state. 166

B.

Council for the Judiciary

The functions, proper powers, accountability of, and relationships
with judges’ interests of the institution called “judicial council” create
enormous controversies in emerging democracies. The concept of a
judicial council as a body to represent the judiciary in the panoply of
state powers and entities is simple enough. But how should it be formed
and with what membership? Should it have exclusive power to select
new judges? Should it control and allocate the judiciary’s budget?
What, if any, role should it have in disciplining judges? Should its
functions be transparent or opaque? Questions like these, and more,
have bedeviled emerging democracies, particularly in post-communist
settings.
Judicial councils are generally composed of the representatives
selected by judges themselves, typically sitting together with a minority
of the representatives from other branches of government. The council
takes over some or all powers relating to the administration of justice,
commonly including the selection and promotion of judges,
disciplinary powers and others that might otherwise be exercised by a
ministry of justice. 167 The underlying idea of the existence of a judicial
165. ENCJ, Councils for the Judiciary Report 2010-2011, supra note 154, at ¶ 3.1; CCJE,
Opinion no.10. ¶ 42. (2007).
166. ENCJ, Councils for the Judiciary Report 2010-2011, supra note 154, at ¶4.1; CCJE
Opinion no.10. ¶ 33 (2007). The “neutral head of state” option exists as a Council Chair
alternative to the more common judge selected by the judiciary itself. CCJE and ENCJ insist on
an impartial person presiding the Council, while having any close relations to political parties.
In parliamentary systems, what is characteristic for Visegrad countries, there is no objection
from CCJE and ENCJ to appoint the Head of the State to the position of the Council. The
President is obliged to give up his affiliation to a political party in the moment he is appointed
to the function. This requirement seems to secure the impartiality of the President, but in fact
does not mean to change the preferences or interests of the President. It is usually perceived as
a formal requirement without any possibility to be controlled or sanctioned.
167. CCJE, Opinion no. 10 ¶ 42 (2007) (recommending that the Council for the Judiciary
ensures that the following tasks, to be performed preferably by the Council itself, or in
cooperation with other bodies, are fulfilled in an independent manner:
•
the selection and appointment of judges
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council is to allow judges to make decisions in cases relatively free
from undue outside or administrative influence and to have one central
body that represents the judiciary in relation with the other branches of
the government. A body of this type was established in Poland
(1989), 168 in Hungary (1997), 169 and in Slovakia (2002). 170 The Czech
Republic is a recent entrant to the EU that did not create a national
council for the judiciary. There were debates about creating such an
institution since 1998. But there is still no Czech statute
or constitutional provision that would create a national council for the
judiciary at present.
C. Judicial Council of the Slovak Republic
The situation in Slovakia receives our greatest attention. Slovakia
had diligently adopted the model of strong judicial independence,
which backfired and did not yield improvements in performance and
independence indicators. In order to assess the reforms of the judiciary
in Slovakia, it is important to understand the forces influencing its
trajectory since the 1989 revolution. After the fall of the communist
regime in 1989 and the division of Czechoslovakia into two states in
1992-93, Slovakia struggled to maintain a democratic regime between
1994-1998. The regime suffered from various defects in its governance
structures and shortcomings in development of the country on many
levels and aspects, including the independent judiciary. 171 Eventually,
the promotion of judges
the evaluation of judges
disciplinary and ethical matters
the training of judges
the control and management of a separate budget
the administration and management of courts
the protection of the image of judges
the provision of opinions to other powers of the State
the co-operation with other relevant bodies on national, European and
international level
•
the responsibility towards the public: transparency, accountability,
reporting).
168. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND art. 186.
169. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF HUNGARY art. 25., sub, 4.
170. CONSTITUTION OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC art. 141a; On the Judicial Council of the
Slovak Republic, Act No. 185/2002 Coll.
171. Regular Report from the Commission on Slovakia’s Progress Towards Accession,
COMMISSION OF THE EUR. COMMUNITIES, (Dec. 17, 1998), http://aei.pitt.edu/44608/1/
slovakia_1998.pdf [https://perma.cc/SW2B-DHEH].
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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an election victory of the pro-reform and pro-European coalition
started to build the institutions; and, through a series of reforms, fasttracked the country on its way towards the EU accession. Among the
reforms, structural independence of the judiciary was introduced upon
the recommendation of numerous recognized documents and
international organizations; yet the country would continue to search
for the balance of independence and accountability for many more
years. The right balance has not yet been found and the country has
suffered as a result.
Before these reforms, procedures for nomination and removal of
judges was under strong, even excessive, powers of the Ministry of
Justice. Judges had to undergo an initial four-year probation period,
during which they were screened out for “fitness” for the judgeship.
Such screenings constituted infringement of the independence
principle, which has been embedded in the constitution since its
adoption in 1992. 172 The judiciary suffered from a lack of capacities of
judges and poor court administration, which led to massive pileups of
caseloads, a problem that has still not been solved. Judges from the
previous regime continued to serve as there has not been a lustration of
judges for their too-close relationships with the communist party and
the former regime. As the political elites of the (semi-)autocratic
regime of 1994-98 were closely connected with former communist
elites, no significant changes to the personnel of the court structures
could have been expected. 173 New judges were thus educated and
socialized in an environment that had not changed significantly from
the previous regime, an environment that was clearly inconsistent with
substantial independence of courts, judiciary, and judges. This lack of
substantial changes to the courts’ personnel turned out to be an
important factor toward the perils of the independent judiciary, just as
well as it was for other public organizations in the post-communist
countries. 174

172. Károly Bárd, Judicial Independence in the Accession Countries of Central and
Eastern Europe and the Baltics, in JUDICIAL INTEGRITY 296 (2004).
173. Although Slovakia signed the first association agreement with the European
Communities in 1991 as a part of Czecho-Slovak Federation and later in 1993 as Slovakia, it did
not receive the invitation to the Communities (Union) along with the rest of the Visegrad
countries due to its democratic deficit in 1994-1998 period. The formal invitation came after the
election victory of the pro-reform coalition in 1998.
174. Bobek, The Fortress of Judicial Independence, supra note 35.
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The reforms adopted by Slovakia in early 2001 were accepted
positively by the European Commission; the reforms were called
“considerable progress.” In 2002, the Commission advised the country
to ensure their proper implementation, in particular placing much hope
on the newly established Judicial Council. 175 Although, the reforms
were politically well-accepted abroad, the domestic political scene was
not wholly unified. 176 Yet, taking into consideration the fact that many
of the critiques of the reform proposals were themselves involved in
attacks on the judiciary during 1994-98 period, this lack of wide
consensus did not necessarily mean very much. Contrary to previous
experiences, the ministry of justice involved the representatives of the
judiciary in cooperation on the reform proposals, especially those
concerning the features of the judicial independence.
In time, the country’s judiciary progressively worsened,
especially during 2006-10, when the formal independence of the
judiciary became even stronger. This resulted from political support of
a parliamentary coalition composed of people who were the prime
actors in the 1994-98 undemocratic era and of people with ties to the
former regime, including the former chief justice of the supreme court,
Štefan Harabin. Independent from elected state actors, the judiciary
developed into a self-interested branch, which became and continues
to be the least trusted public institution in Slovakia. 177
As Kosař described the situation,
The European Commission, supported by the CoE and various
advisory bodies, had the necessary leverage at its disposal and
started to exercise significant pressure on the post-communist
states that sought accession to the EU to adopt particular judicial
reforms. These “pan-European” bodies identified the judicial

175. Regular Report on Slovakia’s Progress Towards Accession, COMMISSION OF THE
EUR. COMMUNITIES, at 24 (Oct. 9, 2002), https://www.esiweb.org/pdf/slovakia_EC%20Regular
%20Report%20on%20Slovakia%202002_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/X3ZC-52MU].
176. Even though the consensus on the reform was not all-encompassing, the
constitutional majority had to be achieved to adopt the reform.
177. 60.4% of respondents did not trust the judiciary in 2016, although the situation
improved in the past few years. This could perhaps be attributed to the corrective measures
introduced recently. See VIA IURIS, REPORT OF THE SURVEY OF THE PUBLIC OPINION ON THE
JUDICIARY (2016).
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council model as the most appropriate means of reforming the
judiciary. 178

However, that does not mean that the model of the council was
well thought through. The Council of Europe and the European Union
merely relied on the work done by the judicial consultative bodies.
Their effort was not significantly discussed or reviewed. 179
The pressure on the aspirant states from the international sphere
is also reflected in the explanatory memoranda to the Slovak
Constitutional Act No. 90/2001 Coll. (“the Act”), which introduced the
Judicial Council. The explanatory report explicitly referenced a
recommendation adopted by the Council of Europe: Recommendation
No. R. (94) from October 12-13, 1994. 180 The explanatory memoranda
pointed also to General Assembly Resolutions 40/32 of November 29,
1985 and 40/146 of December 13, 1985, and the explanatory
memoranda also pointed to the Recommendation of the Council of
Europe No. R. (94) 12 on European Charter on the Statute of Judges of
July 10, 1998. The idea was to strengthen the independence and
autonomy of the judiciary from executive and legislative branches,
which, according to the Report by the expert mission of the European
Commission from November 1997, had too much power while the selfgovernment of judges was practically non-existent. 181
The pressure from the European Union and from the CoE is
evidenced by the Slovak scholarly discourse on various levels. For
example, Drgonec explicitly states that the Judicial Council was
established by the will of the European Union. 182 On the other hand,
Čič and the authors of newer textbooks of the constitutional law do not

178. DAVID KOSAŘ, PERILS OF JUDICIAL SELF-GOVERNMENT IN TRANSITIONAL
SOCIETIES: HOLDING THE LEAST ACCOUNTABLE BRANCH TO ACCOUNT 123 (2016).
179. Michal Bobek & David Kosař, Global Solutions, Local Damages: A Critical Study
in Judicial Councils in Central and Eastern Europe, 15 GER. L.J. NO. 7 1257, 1261 (2014)
(claiming that the Euro-model of the Judicial council is an unsuitable solution to problems of
independency, accountability and performance of courts).
180. Constitutional Act No. 90/2001 Coll., NÁRODNÀ RADA SLOVENSKEJ REPUBLIKY
[NATIONAL
ASSEMBLY
OF
THE
SLOVAK
REPUBLIC]
(2001),
http://www.nrsr.sk/dl/Browser/Document?documentId=162485 [https://perma.cc/5N64-5JKT]
(explaining Constitutional Act No. 90/2001 Coll.).
181. Id.
182. JÁN DRGONEC, ÚSTAVA SLOVENSKEJ REPUBLIKY [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
SLOVAK REPUBLIC] 1205 (2015).
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stress this fact. 183 From the latter point of view, it might seem that the
Judicial Council is a natural part of the Slovak constitutional system,
but this is not the case. Drgonec and even Orosz, who was one of the
drafters of the constitutional amendment establishing the Judicial
Council, reminds us of the drawbacks originating in the outside
pressure. Drgonec states that the Judicial Council was implemented
into the Constitution relatively quickly and the consequences are still
visible. The reason for the existence of the Judicial Council was not
explained and it stays unclear up-to-date. 184 He asserts that even the
explanatory memoranda is unclear, vague and contradictory, while it
also misinterprets the text. 185
Ladislav Orosz, one of the authors of the constitutional
amendment and a Justice of the Constitutional Court since 2009,
commented on the process and result of their effort self-critically. He
admitted that, based on the hectic atmosphere, some failings had
occurred. As to the Judicial Council, he stated that “[w]ith the passing
time and the dangerously evolving power struggle for the rule over
judiciary it shows that the writers of the constitutional amendment had
a too idealistic vision about . . . the end adopted means of composition
and operation of the Judicial Council.” 186
Because the Judicial Council lacked a constitutional definition,
the Constitutional Court tried to provide one. The understanding of the
institution evolved from the “constitutional public authority body
which guarantees independent position of the judiciary in relation to

183. MILAN ČIČ ET AL., KOMENTÁR K ÚSTAVE SLOVENSKEJ REPUBLIKY [THE
COMMENTARY TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC] (2012); see, e.g., DANIEL
KROŠLÁK ET AL., ÚSTAVNÉ PRÁVO [CONSTITUTIONAL LAW] 616 (2016) (claiming that the
raison d’être of the Judicial Council was the effort to diversify the judicial legitimacy).
184. DRGONEC, supra note 182.
185. DRGONEC, supra note 182.
186. LADISLAV OROSZ ET AL., ÚSTAVNÝ SYSTÉM SLOVENSKEJ REPUBLIKY (DOTERAJŠÍ
VÝVOJ, AKTUÁLNY STAV, PERSPEKTÍVY) [CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM OF THE SLOVAK
REPUBLIC (EVOLUTION, PRESENT STATE, PERSPECTIVES)] 59 (2009). One of the issues Orosz
had in mind was perhaps the merged seat of the President of the Supreme Court and President
of the Judicial Council. In fact, the formal powers of those two positions are theoretically more
or less organizational, but when occupied by one person he or she becomes the face of the
judiciary and seems to have strong legitimacy. This was the case of Štefan Harabin. Hence, the
constitution was changed, and positions were separated in 2014. Moreover, there is discussion
about nature of the Judicial Council and its position in the constitutional system. We will return
to this issue in context of the parameter of independence of the Judicial Council.
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other state authorities” 187 through the “self-government body sui
generis” which performs even the functions of public administration
body 188 and the body whose “fundamental institutional component is
independence” 189 to be finally understood as the “special independent
constitutional body of judicial power that guarantees mainly
independence of judiciary and judicial legitimacy, while it is
responsible for the operation of judiciary, administration of the judicial
power and judiciary and also for transparency of the judiciary; hence it
shall be the fully-fledged partner of the legislative and executive
power.” 190
However, the Constitutional Court later on reflected on the reality
that the Euro-model is only one of many possible models and that it
cannot be claimed that one model is suitable for each state because its
mechanical transposition cannot guarantee the wanted level of
independence, efficiency, and professionalism. 191 The Euro-model was
just that: a model. It was not designed with reference to local conditions
in each of the entering states. The Constitutional Court even warned
against the prospect of corporativism within the judiciary if the Judicial
Council would be governed by judges. 192 However, it still awarded the
Judicial Council with the characteristics of independence. This became
a matter of debate. Judge Mészáros in his dissenting opinion warned
that the Constitutional Court was itself writing the Constitution because
the Judicial Council was not defined as independent in the Constitution.
If the Constitutional Court does so, he continues, there is a need to
explain what independence of that body means in practice: what is the
Judicial Council is independent of and to what it is independent. 193
In most countries, when introducing the concept of judicial
independence to law students or lay persons, it is not common to offer
disclaimers in the same breath. However, in Slovakia, warnings about
187. Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic no. III. ÚS 79/04 (Oct.
29, 2004) (Slovk.).
188. Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic no. I. ÚS 62/06 (Mar. 1,
2006) (Slovk.).
189. Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic no. IV. ÚS 46/2011 (Feb.
17, 2011) (Slovk.).
190. Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic no. PL. ÚS 2/2012 (Nov.
18, 2015) (Slovk.).
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic PL. ÚS 2/2012 (Nov. 1
(Mészáros, J. dissenting) (Slovk.).
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misunderstandings of the concept of independence found its way even
into textbooks. Svák and Cibulka, while quoting the decision of the
Constitutional Court, stress that independence is not the privilege of
judges but the inevitable condition of the accountability of the judiciary
for making impartial and independent judicial decisions. Then they
state that after the revolution in 1989 judges rightly asked for
independence. However, their successful political pressure motivated
mainly by personal guarantees of independence pushed back the
purpose of independence. 194 The means were mistaken for the end, and
the actual purpose of judicial independence was lost within the selfinterest of the judges. 195
D. Selection and Appointment of Judges of the
General Courts
Changes in the Slovak law that were justified by the requirements
of the European Union and other international bodies led to insulation
of judiciary in the selection of new judges and to the partial backlash
(e.g., Constitutional Court struck down part of the law) when
Parliament tried to address the problem of this insulation in 2011. The
EU criticism about the lack of independence of the Slovak judiciary in
the process of accession also focused on the system of selection and
appointment of judges. 196 Again, the independence as a means to
achieve impartial justice was mistaken for the end. In the 1990’s, judge
selection was in the hands of the legislative and executive power.197
The Parliament elected judges of the general courts based on proposals
from the Minister of Justice. 198 In 2001, the Judicial Council was given
the competence to nominate judges for appointment (and removal) to
the President of the Republic which was supposed to limit the influence
on judges coming from state actors. 199 The Judicial Council considered
194. JAN SVÁK & ĽUBOR CIBULKA, ÚSTAVNÉ PRÁVO SLOVENSKEJ REPUBLIKY
[CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC] 402 (2006).
195. Id.
196. ŁUKASZ BOJARSKI &WERNER S. KÖSTER, THE SLOVAK JUDICIARY: ITS CURRENT
STATE AND CHALLENGES 74 (2011)
197. ÚSTAVA SLOVENSKEJ REPUBLIKY [CONSTITUTION OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC], No.
460/1992 Coll. arts. 86(i), 145, para. 1 (Slovk.).
198. Id.
199. ÚSTAVA SLOVENSKEJ REPUBLIKY [CONSTITUTION OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC], No.
460/1992 Coll., after adoption of the Constitutional Act No. 90/2001 Coll. art. 141a, para. 4(a)
(Slovk.).
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applicants who succeeded before the selection committee or who had
status of judicial candidates. 200 The composition of committees varied
over time: between 2001 until 2011, the majority of committee
membership was constituted by the judiciary (council of judges: selfadministrative unit on respective courts, presidents of the courts,
collegium of presidents of the courts, etc.) and almost always solely of
judges. 201 Essentially, the judges selected new judges at the level of
selection committee and more or less also at the level of Judicial
Council. The judicial candidates who could become judges directly
without participation in selection of judges were also selected in a
procedure administered by judges. 202
There were many complaints of nepotism and corruption in
selection process. 203 Sometimes the names of successful applicants
were known even before the selection procedure started. 204 Too many
applicants and judicial candidates seemed to be connected with
judges. 205 Hence a reform was proposed.
Minister of Justice, Lucia Žitňanská, strived to “open” the
judiciary by changing the system of appointment of judges. Based on
law from 2011, the selection became much more transparent and judges
also lost the majority on selection committees. The new committees
were supposed to consist of two members from the basket created by
200. On Judges and Lay Judges Act No. 385/2000 Coll. § 28 (Slovk.). Judicial candidates
or judicial trainees were lawyers who were trained specifically in order to become judges.
201. Id.
202. Act No. 40/1964 Coll. (Slovk.); Act No. 401/2006 Coll. (Slovk.); Act No. 430/2009
Coll.; Act No. 132/2017 Coll (Slovk.).
203. The informal symbol of nepotism (of course without any formal charge) became
Judge Imrich Volkai, the President of the Regional Court of Košice. The members of his family
such as his wife, daughter, son-in-law or daughter-in-law all work on the court he serves on or
within the region of Košice. One should note that his daughter-in-law became judge after the
reforms, under a new more transparent selection, but again with majority of judicial power in
selection committees. See, e.g., Samuel Spáč a Erik Skácal, Rozrastie sa Sudcovsky Klan
Volkaiovcov o DALŠIU POSILU?, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL SLOVENSKO BLOG (Nov.
27, 2015), http://transparency.sk/sk/rozrastie-sa-sudcovsky-klan-volkaiovcov-o-dalsiu-posilu/
[https://perma.cc/WF75-4SLF ].
204. See, e.g., Interview with Jana Dubovcová, former judge who later became the Slovak
ombudsperson, (Apr. 23, 2010), available at https://www.pluska.sk/plus7dni/rozhovor/04/
ovladnuta-justicia.html [https://perma.cc/WA3X-JZJS ].
205. See, e.g., Kto je s kym Rodina na našich súdoch, SME BLOG (Nov. 20, 2013),
https://transparency.blog.sme.sk/c/342665/Kto-je-s-kym-rodina-na-nasich-sudoch.html
[https://perma.cc/9JCC-9MKD]; Hlásite sa za sudcu? Mat’ rodinu v justí?, SME BLOG (May
16, 2014), https://transparency.blog.sme.sk/c/356200/hlasite-sa-za-sudcu-mat-rodinu-vjusticii-pomoze.html [https://perma.cc/X4S5-FRTX].
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the Minister of Justice, one member from the basket created by the
Parliament, one member from the basket established by the Judicial
Council and one member elected by the local council of judges of the
court with vacant seats. 206 Those members did not need to be judges,
nor even lawyers, but they had to be able to evaluate the candidates.
The members of the committees were chosen from the baskets by the
president of the court with vacant seats. 207 However, the reform was
challenged before the Constitutional Court by a group of forty-six
members of the parliament claiming that it violated the principle of
independence of the judiciary and international standards,208
specifically claiming that judges did not have a majority in the selection
committees as the Recommendation suggested. 209 They also
interpreted establishment of the Judicial Council as the proof that
judges had to have a majority vote in the process of judicial
appointment, otherwise the process violated the independence of the
judiciary and it was unconstitutional. 210 Unfortunately, the majority of
the Constitutional Court in part agreed with the applicants. The
Constitutional Court stated that even though three branches of power
cooperated in the process of selection and appointment of judges, only
the judge selected by the selection committee could get before the
Judicial Council and hence the selection committee had a crucial say in
the process. 211 As the majority of the committee members were
selected by the political branches, the Constitutional Court simply
stated that there was a threat of politicization of the judiciary and hence
the law violated the principle of the separation of powers. 212 As a result,
the Constitutional Court provided constitutional relevance, even force,
to the recommendations of international organizations. Obviously, the
international non-binding standards received strong legitimacy in the
1990s, because of the semi-authoritative regime under Vladimir Mečiar
206. Act on Judges No. 385/2000 Coll. §§ 28, 29 (effective May 1, 2011) (Slovk.).
207. Id.
208. See Recommendation No. R (94) 12 of the Comm. of Ministers to Member States on
the Independence, Efficiency, and Role of Judges, COMMISSION OF MINISTERS (Oct. 13, 1994),
https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=
09000016804c84e2 [https://perma.cc/2Z2K-GZXL].
209. Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic no. PL. ÚS 102/2011,
Arguments of Claimants (Slovk.).
210. Id.
211. Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic no. PL. ÚS 102/2011,
Part VI.E. (Slovk.).
212. Id.
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during that time, since they were seen as a road to developed West. But
it is problematic to “blindly” rely on recommendations addressed to
countries with different legal systems, constitutional experience and
civil society or even to over-interpret them in order to back up the
problematic argument such as the claim that independence of judiciary
means that judges must have decisive vote in selection of judges.
The 2011 series of reforms proposal further aimed at increasing
the accountability. 213 Transparency of the branch was strengthened by
publishing of all courts decisions, information and documents about
selection and promotion procedures and the recordings of meetings of
the Judicial Council. 214 Moreover, the reports on judges’ performance
got more frequent and thorough. 215 Further reforms were introduced in
recent years in order to balance the strong independence with
appropriately strong accountability, such as improving the selection
procedures and their supervision, increasing the efficiency of
disciplinary procedures, and the evaluation of judges. The position of
the Chairman of the Judicial Council became separated from the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court in 2014, with the goal of diluting the
previous concentration of judicial management power in one
individual. 216 Moreover, the composition of the Judicial Council
should progressively change, as the recent change of legislation
indicates that the parliament, president and the government nominate
non-judges for members of the Judicial Council. 217 These recent
corrective measures should be understood as an attempt to swing the
pendulum of power division towards the accountability, although it
213. See Act No. 33/2011 Coll., Explanatory Memoranda (Sept. 22, 2010) (Slovk.),
available
at
https://www.nrsr.sk/web/Dynamic/Download.aspx?DocID=346941
[https://perma.cc/SGF8-WP27]; Act No. 467/2011 Coll., Explanatory Memoranda (Jan. 18,
2012) (Slovk.), available at https://www.najpravo.sk/dovodove-spravy/rok-2011/467-2011-zz.html.
214. This was done by the series of laws – Act no. 495/2010 Coll., Act no. 33/2011 Coll.
and Act no. 467/2011 Coll. - that, among others, amended the Act of judges, Act on Courts or
Act on Judicial Council of the Slovak Republic. See Act No. 495/2010 Coll. (Slovk.); Act No.
33/2011 Coll. (Slovk.); Act No. 467/2011 Coll (Slovk.)
215. See Act on Judges No. 385/2000 Coll. §§ 27 (effective Jan. 1, 2012) (Slovk.).
216. See Constitutional Act No. 161/2014 Coll., amending Art. 141a of the Constitution
and the Explanatory Memoranda (Slovk.), available at https://www.nrsr.sk/web/Dynamic/
Download.aspx?DocID=397222 [https://perma.cc/6VZJ-BAWC].
217. See Act No. 152/2017 Coll., amending On Judicial Council of the Slovak Republic
Act No. 185/2002 Coll (Slovk.). The President, the government and the parliament each
nominates three members of the Judicial Council out of a total of eighteen members. A direct
vote by judges elects the other nine members.
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remains to be seen whether and when the pendulum eventually finds its
balance.
V. PROBLEMS FOSTERED BY THE EU-ENCOURAGED MODEL:
TOO MUCH INDEPENDENCE?
Although the model presented in the documents of the Council of
Europe 218 and the European Union 219 perhaps might produce good
results, it was not the case of CEE post-communist countries. There the
model in practice produced an isolated, largely unaccountable judiciary
staffed and especially led by judges bent on corrupt, self-favoring
action. Firstly, there was no significant personnel change in the
judiciary. 220 A majority of judges were educated before 1989 and after
1989 the school system did not accomplish any mentionable reform. It
was unwise to bestow extensive self-regulatory powers on a postcommunist judiciary immediately after the fall of the regime. 221
Furthermore, the model enabled the majoritarian group of judges
to select their own candidates and exclude those with opposing
opinions on the reforms of the judiciary. 222 In fact, if the majority
prefers the status quo, the Council of Europe would be highly unlikely
to initiate any reform of the judiciary. 223 The model is not fit to counter
the accumulation of power in hands of a few. 224 Judges might have a
tendency to elect a person who furthers their interests: guarantees them
higher salaries, less accountability, and more independence, behind
which corruption more easily exists without detection. This shows that
the key change is not the formal institutional reform that established
independence but the switch of an attitude of the judges, a courage to
be independent and accountable. As Zalar claims: “[The] introduction
of judicial self-government in a situation of transition does not entail

218. See CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL OF EUROPEAN JUDGES, Opinion No. 10, (Nov. 23,
2007), https://rm.coe.int/168074779b [https://perma.cc/Y5HJ-M46G].
219. See EUROPEAN NETWORK OF COUNCILS FOR THE JUDICIARY, COUNCILS FOR THE
JUDICARY REPORT 2010-2011 (2011).
220. See Bobek, supra note 35, at 105-06
221. Id.
222. See, e.g., CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL OF EUROPEAN JUDGES, Opinion No. 10, (Nov.
23, 2007), https://rm.coe.int/168074779b [https://perma.cc/TF5T-5MH7].
223. Id.
224. Id.
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anything other than the preservation of the judiciary as it was
established by the undemocratic communist authorities.” 225
In his recent analytical work, Spáč looked systematically at the
selection procedures of new judges under the formally independent
judiciary system in Slovakia. Unsurprisingly, the analysis showed
strong tendency of the judiciary to favor like-minded candidates for the
office. 226 In fact, “the statistical analysis clearly demonstrated that
candidates with higher social and cultural capital – hence those who
either knew someone in the committee or had a relative who was a
judge, were preferred.” 227 Moreover, “these candidates were more
likely to succeed in each part of the process.” 228
[T]he research showed that judge-dominated selection process of
new judges does not produce selection based on merit, but in
bureaucratic judiciaries with bureaucratic and corporatist attitudes
prefers such candidates that are likely to protect the status quo. A
system which such a selection produces creates networks of
gratitude and loyalty where less experienced judges can be
considerably controlled by senior judges or judges higher in the
hierarchy in such a way that could pose a substantial threat to
output independence. This particularly applies to judiciaries where
non- democratic legacies are still present and where judges served
regimes and were willing to implement laws in such a way that
conformed with preferences of ruling elites. Finally, judgedominated models of judicial selection are likely to create a
situation where judiciary may protect itself from effective
accountability, where it will be perceived as not independent, and
where judges will be willing to abuse their powers to foster their
interests – whatever they may be. 229

As Bobek and Kosař noticed, the model pressed on CEE entrants
to the European Union most resembles the Italian model—Consiglio
Superiore della Magistratura. 230 On the one hand, it is one of the oldest
Councils for Judiciary in Europe, but it is also often criticized for lack
225. Bostjan Zalar, From ‘Communist Legacy’ to Capacity Building to Better Manage the
Rule of Law, in CENTRAL EUROPEAN JUDGES UNDER THE INFLUENCE: TRANSFORMATIVE
POWER OF THE EU REVISITED 149, 156 (Michal Bobek ed., 2015).
226. Spáč, supra note 10, at 131, et passim.
227. Spáč, supra note 105, at 131.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Michal Bobek & David Kosař, Global Solutions, Local Damages: A Critical Study
in Judicial Councils in Central and Eastern Europe, 15 GER. L.J. NO. 7, 1270 (2014).
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of accountability and low efficiency. 231 It is a model that is focused on
strict detachment from other branches of government, 232 but inside the
judiciary it is uncertain whether it could save the judiciary from
dictatorship or oligarchization.
The concept of judicial independence has been misused and
abused by some parts of the judiciary who shielded their often
unethical, unlawful or status-quo-defending behavior with a cloak of
the independence.
Judicial independence has been used, for instance, to explain why
to disregard established case law of higher courts and thus render
the judicial process almost unpredictable; why not to display the
full name of deciding judges in published decision of the court;
why it is impossible for judges to regularly publish their assets and
incomes; why there cannot be any legal obligation for judges to
follow continuous education after their appointment; or why only
judges have to keep 13th and 14th salaries when the government
is trying to push through cuts in public savings. . . 233

This abuse of the argument of independence went so far, that
when judges needed help from media and public to save their
independence, there was nobody who stood up to protect them. 234
For a long time, independence as a value was in the limelight, but
recently the consequences of too much of independence have been
admitted. 235 It is much easier to ask for institutional independence, than
231. See CARLO GAUNIERI & PATRIZIA PEDERZOLI, THE POWER OF JUDGES:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF COURTS AND DEMOCRACY 54–59, 174–77 (Cheryl A. Thomas ed.,
2002).
232. See id.
233. Bobek, supra note 35, at 112-13.
234. In 2014, the National Council of Slovak Republic adopted a constitutional
amendment that allows surveillance of the candidates and judges already on the bench via the
National Security Office. Judges might not have been aware of this surveillance. CCJE
concluded that this was a serious breach of the principles of independence of the judiciary and
separation of powers. However, it must be stressed that the Judicial Council has the final word
on the evaluation of surveillance. The law was challenged before the Constitutional Court, and
the case is pending. Radka Minarechová , New security clearances for judges implemented, Za
Otvorenu Justiciú (Oct. 2, 2015, 06:30 P.M.), http://www.sudcovia.sk/en/documents/38external/1969-new-security-clearances-for-judges-implemented [https://perma.cc/Q8JZ-JJZ9].
235. Compare COMM. OF MINISTERS, Recommendation No. R (94) 12 of the Comm. of
Ministers to Member States on the Independence, Efficiency, and Role of Judges, and Opinion
no. 1 with CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL OF EUROPEAN JUDGES (CCJE], Magna Carta of Judges
(Nov. 17, 2010) (setting independence, liability, and remuneration, etc. as priorities). Later,
more recent documents of CCJE and CEPEJ put accountability and transparency forward.
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to ask for ethical self-reflection, respecting of code of ethics,
transparency and controlling system of the competence of the judges.
Yet, based on the case-study of post-communist transition of judiciary
in Slovakia and other CEE countries we can conclude that selfadministration and independence should be given to judges after their
competency and accountability is proved. It is difficult to expect selfreflection after the period, when justice has been abused as an everyday
routine as Leah Wortham mentioned: “How do you create respect for
the rule of law where the honorable thing to do, in some countries, was
to avoid the law?” 236
Euro-model does not consider specifics of every system. Every
country has specific system of checks and balances, depending on how
much power is situated in whose hands. This process has been
developing for decades and still is not over. After that, a model policy
could be harmful for emerging democracies that do not have a tradition
of self-administration of judiciary, that would be accountable to a welldeveloped civil society. In some ways over-reacting to concerns about
the obvious lack of judicial independence in communist times, the
European Union pressed systems on the new members that overemphasized judicial independence. The unfortunate consequences are
systems that operate with too little judicial accountability, shielding
judicial leadership and local judges alike from scrutiny, a condition that
is conducive to corruption. In addition, the EU-pressed systems, while
creating excessive insulation for judges from state actors, did nothing
to discourage control of local judges by judge-superiors such as court
presidents. So while local judges may be well-insulated from
interference from elected state actors, the same system opens them to
interference by court presidents who control significant parts of the
local judge’s existence.

Notice that Recommendation no. R (94) 12, and the European Charter on the Statute for Judges
do not mention transparency at all. COMM. OF MINISTERS, Recommendation No. R (94) 12 of
the Comm. of Ministers to Member States on the Independence, Efficiency, and Role of Judges
(Oct.
13,
1994),
https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/
DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016804c84e2
[https://perma.cc/J82G-ZN4G];
COUNCIL OF EUROPE, European Charter on the Statute for Judges (July 10, 1998),
https://rm.coe.int/16807473ef [https://perma.cc/2PTG-WF8J].
236. Aubrey McCutcheon, Eastern Europe: Funding Strategies for Public Interest Law in
Transitional Societies, in MANY ROADS TO JUSTICE 233, 235 (Mary McClymount & Stephen
Golub eds., 2000).
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Liability and Accountability: Unexplained Difference in CEE
Judiciary

A problem of adopting the right ratio of independence and
accountability lies often in the perception of ethical and legal duties,
therefore in understanding what the difference between accountability
and liability really is. As we mentioned when discussing the history of
CEE countries, the perception of the importance of ethical principles is
very low. It became more than clear for politicians, public figures, as
well as for ordinary inhabitants, that only the law has that miraculous
power of enforcement. For the last seventy years, forty years of the
authoritarian regime and another almost thirty years of transition,
traditional normative systems such as morality and ethics have been
neglected and forgotten somewhere in the background. They did not,
and could not have, reemerged as a simple result of granting
independence to the judiciary.
The judiciary is no different from the rest of the country. As Jiří
Příbáň mentioned regarding the Czech judiciary:
moral dimension of personal independence is somehow
problematic. . . . Czech judges tend to mistake moral and ethical
behaviour for legality. The popular perception is that as long as no
legal provision is violated, the behavior is “moral”. This problem
is then multiplied by lacking peer pressure and censure and
deficient sanction mechanism. . . . 237

Michal Bobek also points out a very narrow understanding of the
ethical scope of independence and accountability in the CEE countries.
Often, the CEE idea of the independence was the right to a lawful
judge.
This right is a typical post-totalitarian reaction device, which was
introduced to avoid any (further) political manipulation in the
allocation of cases and the assignment of certain cases to
politically “conscious” judges. The “reply character” of this
constitutional right determines its geographical application:
having German origins, the right to a lawful judge was, after the
fall of Communism, taken on into quite a few of the Central and
Eastern European constitutions. We do not find any similar
237. Bobek, supra note 15, at 110 (citing Jiří Přibáň, Independence as a Value of Legal
Thinking, Address at the Conference on Judicial Independence by the Czech Bar Association,
(Oct. 20, 2006)).”
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principle in countries with no or minimal totalitarian experience,
typically the United Kingdom. 238

Unlike their position at the time of accession, the Council of
Europe and the European Union have finally noticed this problem and
started to recognize the importance of accountability as a counterpart
of independence in their documents. 239 These documents summarize
the principles of ethics of a judge that represent an accountability of the
judge. 240 ENCJ recently states:
Independence and accountability go together: accountability is a
prerequisite for independence. Independence is granted by society.
A Judiciary that does not want to be accountable to society and has
no eye for societal needs will not gain the trust of society and will
endanger its independence in the short or long run. Accountability
without independence reduces the Judiciary to a government
agency. 241

The need for codification is a characteristic feature of the
continental legal culture. 242 Every rule that is binding, is expected to be
laid down in writing. Codes of ethics and codes of professional conduct
have started to be very important instruments in thriving for excellence
in professions, including the judiciary. The goal of such principles in
a code is to perfectly express the quintessence of certain activity. CEE
countries lag in the proper observance and enforcement of these
principles. 243
Confusion comes from the existence of different levels of
normative rules with different consequences, if violated. In addition to
the legal framework that limits action, there are disciplinary and ethical
boundaries as well. CCJE strictly distinguishes among three types of
rules: statutory rules, disciplinary rules, and standards of professional
conduct. 244

238. Id. at 111-12.
239. See Opinion No. 3, CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL OF EUROPEAN JUDGES (Nov. 19,
2002), https://rm.coe.int/16807475bb [https://perma.cc/PKJ5-R9K7]; see also EUROPEAN
NETWORK OF COUNCILS FOR THE JUDICIARY, COUNCILS FOR THE JUDICIARY REPORT 20162017 INTRODUCTION (2017) [hereinafter ENCJ].
240. Id.
241. See ENCJ, supra note 239.
242. CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL OF EUROPEAN JUDGES, supra note 210, at ¶ 41.
243. See ENCJ, supra note 237.
244. Id. at ¶ 45.
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Standards of professional conduct are different from statutory and
disciplinary rules. They express the profession’s ability to reflect
its function in values matching public expectations by way of
counterpart to the powers conferred on it. These are self-regulatory
standards which involve recognizing that the application of the law
is not a mechanical exercise, involves real discretionary power and
places judges in a relationship of responsibility to themselves and
to citizens. 245

Furthermore, CCJE admits the danger of ambiguous
interpretation of vague ethical principles. 246 Moreover, it is aware of
the fact that without discussion about the essence of the principles their
application might be too rigid. 247 In that context it suggests to speak of
“statement of standards of professional conduct,” rather than of “a
code”. 248
The disturbing circumstance in CEE countries is quite the
opposite. Accountability is not confused with criminal, civil or
disciplinary liability. On the contrary, there is a common bias against
any other responsibility other than legal or disciplinary liability. It
could be said—what is not illegal cannot be wrong.
So where is accountability? Just like independence is not intended
to serve the judge, but is a right of individuals towards the government,
in the same way, the accountability is owed to public by judges, as the
proof that they do not abuse their independence. Accountability has two
perspectives. First, it obliges from inside: for a judge, it motivates her
to stand by ethical principles that are essential for the vocation. 249 One
of the best instruments to secure accountability of the judge is an
established, effective and respected code of professional conduct. It
signals outward, for the public, the values endorsed by the judiciary
and communicates what people can expect from an honorable judge. It
also binds inward and sets the list of the values of the vocation for the
judge herself. The way a judge is supposed to present her good will and
devotion to fundamental principles of the judiciary is in the opinion
that she provides in decision and reasoning she applies. These two are
essential and crucial instruments of securing accountability.
245. Id. at ¶ 45.
246. Id. at ¶ 46.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL OF EUROPEAN JUDGES, supra note 210, at ¶ 50
(summarizing those principles of conduct).
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The CEE approach to rules is a never-ending story of textualist
and formalist approaches, that disables the application of these
principles to advance administration of the judiciary, to raise the trust
of the judiciary among public and to build on integrity and quintessence
of the judiciary: a judiciary that is both accountable and independent.
Independence without accountability poses serious problems. It is
an unstable model because it insulates judicial acts of greed and
corruption from examination. It risks destruction of transparency of
judicial decision-making. 250 For example, Romania has a completely
autonomous judiciary. 251 It is controlled by a judicial council with
nineteen members. 252 Four of these members are appointed with some
influence by the Senate while the other fifteen are magistrates
appointed exclusively by the judicial council. 253 Discipline of judges is
done exclusively by the judicial council. This configuration makes the
judiciary completely isolated from the executive and legislative
branches. 254 As a result, Romania has been repeatedly reprimanded by
the European Commission for the judiciary’s lack of transparency and
accountability. 255 It has come to the point that “‘while judges may see
the Council as a body responsive to those who elected them, the
Council no longer sees its position as being judges’ representative but
as one who owns the judiciary . . . .” 256 Therefore, problems with
accountability, impartiality, and transparency persist.
And Slovakia has struggled with a prolonged period of judicial
domination by one man and his comrades, Štefan Harabin. In 2014,
Harabin was rejected in his re-election efforts for both President of the
Supreme Court and Chair of the Judicial Council, marking some
progress. 257 Nonetheless, his influence runs deep into the judiciary, and
he remains on the Supreme Court with life tenure, so his period of
domination may have diminished but is not yet closed. 258 The media
and NGOs report highly questionable judicial conduct, most of which
250. See Parau, supra note 67, at 6–7.
251. Id. at 17.
252. Id. at 17-18.
253. Id. at 17-18.
254. Id. at 17.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 20.
257. See, e.g., John Boyd, Harabin Loses Grip on Slovak Judiciary, THEDAILY.SK (May
20, 2014), http://www.thedaily.sk/harabin-loses-grip-on-slovak-judiciary/.
258. Id.
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was made possible by too great a level of judicial independence and too
low a level of accountability and transparency. 259 Harabin had moved
from the Supreme Court in mid-2006 to become the Minister of Justice
only to arrange reforms transferring competences from the ministry on
the Judicial Council. 260 Upon leaving the Ministry in 2009, he got
elected to become the chief justice of the Supreme Court, who was at
the same time chairman of the Judicial Council, finalizing his massive
conflict of interests. This controversial figure dominated the Slovak
judiciary for years through some of the following means: (i) initiating
of disciplinary motion against judges acting contrary to his interests;
(ii) using harsh sanctions against his opponents, such as removal of
judges from their office or imposing salary reductions; (iii) influencing
of nomination of the Judicial Council members and regional court
presidents; (iv) misusing the hierarchical structure of the judiciary and
his powers as the chief justice of the highest court (Supreme Court) to
provide extraordinary remuneration to judges favoring his interests,
manipulate the allocation of cases, or influencing of particular decision
making of other judges; (v) deploying harassing libel cases against
media criticizing his actions; and (vi) facilitating nepotism in judges
selection procedures. 261 These actions eventually mounted up to the
point where the judiciary was completely hijacked by the interests of
the few powerful actors within the judiciary and their web of judges
who owed their positions to the few powerful actors.
As will be shown, Harabin consolidated his power when he, one,
deployed harassing disciplinary motions against dissenters, and two,
259. ŁUKASZ BOJARSKI &WERNER S. KÖSTER, THE SLOVAK JUDICIARY: ITS CURRENT
STATE AND CHALLENGES 74 (2011).
260. Štefan Harabin, as the minister, drafted the amendment of the Act on judges no.
385/2009 Coll., and the draft law was introduced by the government. While the law was
discussed in the Parliament, Harabin resigned as minister of justice and was elected the chief
justice of the Supreme Court and (hence automatically) President of the Judicial Council. The
law, however, was widely criticized and the government withdrew it from the Parliament. For
the drafted law and the legislative process, see Vládny návrh zákona, ktorým sa mení a dopĺňa
zákon č. 385/2000 Z. z. o sudcoch a prísediacich a o zmene a doplnení niektorých zákonov v
znení neskorších predpisov a o zmene a doplnení niektorých zákonov [Government bill
amending Act no. 385/2000 Coll. On the Judiciary and the Supreme Court and on Amendments
to Certain Acts, as amended, and on Amendments to Certain Acts], NARODNA RADA
SLOVENSKEJ
REPUBLIKY
(Mar.
27,
2009)
https://www.nrsr.sk/web/Default.aspx?sid=zakony/zakon&ZakZborID=13&CisObdobia=4&C
PT=1014 [https://perma.cc/5DZH-MNRE].
261. ŁUKASZ BOJARSKI &WERNER S. KÖSTER, THE SLOVAK JUDICIARY: ITS CURRENT
STATE AND CHALLENGES 82-83 (2011).
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manipulated so called anti-discrimination claims of judges against the
state. 262 In these ways and many others, judges (supported by Harabin
in his position of minister of justice and later in the position of the
president of the Supreme Court and the president of the Judicial
Council) promoted their own final interest while misinterpreting the
concept of independence. Alternatively, all of this might be simply be
understood as a clear example of internal corruption within the
judiciary, made easier by the high level of judicial independence and
absence of meaningful accountability.
The state of judiciary in Slovakia attracted wide public attention
around 2009 when more than 100 judges signed the document called
‘Five Sentences’. 263 They stressed the importance of freedom of
expression even within judiciary, and they claimed that the fear that
existed and spread within the judiciary harmed discussion about the
state of judiciary and the reasons for the public’s low trust in it. 264 This
petition was a reaction to disciplinary motions initiated against those
dissented against Harabin’s judiciary. The first wave of motions
included, for example, the case of Judge Darina Kuchtová (initiated by
Štefan Harabin while still Minister of Justice) who was accused of
infringing the respect for the function of the judge and detracting from
the dignity of the judge’s office because she had served as a witness in
a criminal libel action filed by another judge (Pavol Polka), expressing
her opinion on the judge’s character. 265 She stated that she only
responded to the questions of the court and that there was no legal basis
for her not to serve as witness. 266 She was never accused to provide
false testimony. The disciplinary senate of the first instance found her
guilty in 2009. 267
Another case is related to the motion against a former Judge Jana
Dubovcová who signed a petition on the website of a reputable
262. See id.; see also NEMOC TRETEJ MOCI [DISEASE OF THE THIRD POWER], (Atelier.doc,
2011).
263. Five Sentences, ZA OTVORENU JUSTICIU (Mar. 28, 2010),
http://www.sudcovia.sk/en/documents/archive/202-five-sentences [https://perma.cc/P8G5W2BE].
264. Id.
265. See 3. Prípad – sudkyňa Darina Kuchtová [3. Case – Judge Darina Kuchtová], ZA
OTVORENU JUSTICIU (Oct. 15, 2009) http://www.zoj.sk/sk/dokumenty/disciplinarnekonania/61-darina-kuchtova [https://perma.cc/A4E4-ET9K].
266. Id.
267. Id.
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watchdog organization that asked the Judicial Council not to elect
Štefan Harabin for the position of the president of the Supreme Court
and the chairman of the Judicial Council. 268 She allegedly diminished
trust in the judiciary, infringed the respect for the function of the judge
and detracted from the dignity of the judge’s office. 269 The sanction
asked for was removal from the office. 270 Her office was terminated by
the decision of the Minister of Justice (Viera Petriková, who became
the minister after Harabin) but the motion was withdrawn shortly after
the case became public and “Five sentences” were published. 271
The third case featured a disciplinary motion filed by Štefan
Harabin as the President of the Supreme Court against the judge of the
Supreme Court and dissenter, Miroslav Gavalec. Gavalec wrote a letter
to the Health Care Surveillance Authority (“HCSA”) with a request to
evaluate the health conditions at the work place, the Supreme Court
building. However, the HCSA had no jurisdiction over this matter.
Because the HCSA lacked jurisdiction, Harabin claimed that Miroslav
Gavalec had violated his duty to continual education and that he
diminished the public trust in the judiciary as he did not address his
motion to the competent authority. 272
In 2015, Štefan Harabin spoke of the new president of the
Supreme Court as somebody who was controlled only by the public
opinion and politicians. He also said: “She is in a way lamentable lady.
I tell you, in a short time she can end up in the mental hospital. And
they will blame me. But it is not my fault.” 273 The disciplinary senate
in the first instance (the case is still pending) decided that Harabin did
268. See 6. Prípad – sudkyňa Jana Dubovcová [6. Case – Judge Jana Dubovcová], ZA
OTVORENU JUSTICIU (Oct. 15, 2009), http://www.zoj.sk/sk/dokumenty/disciplinarnekonania/64-jana-dubovcova [https://perma.cc/KQA2-BDPZ].
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. See Harabin stiahol disciplinarny navrh na sudcu Gavalca, SME DOMOV (May 28,
2014),
https://domov.sme.sk/c/7218307/harabin-stiahol-disciplinarny-navrh-na-sudcugavalca.html [https://perma.cc/C3Y3-XXCS]; see also 14 Disciplinárnych Konaní Sudcov–14
Otáznikov, TRANSPARENTNOST SPRAVODLIVOST OTVORENOST (Feb. 2, 2011),
.
http://www.zoj.sk/sk/dokumenty/disciplinarne-konania/406-14disck-14ot
[https://perma.cc/4JR5-CKEC]; Michaela Stanková, Fifteen judges sound loud warning, THE
SLOVAK SPECTATOR (Sept. 21, 2009), https://spectator.sme.sk/c/20033929/fifteen-judgessound-loud-warning.html [https://perma.cc/3Q29-NLWC].
273. Šéfka najvyššieho súdu je chudera, Harabin urazil aj Kisku, WEBNOVINY (Oct. 20,
2016), https://www.webnoviny.sk/sefka-najvyssieho-sudu-je-chudera-harabin-urazil-aj-kisku/
[https://perma.cc/HX2X-AAXF].
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not violate the rules of ethics because the subjective mens rea was
missing: he did not intend to diminish trust in judiciary. 274 Standards
of evaluation of unethical behavior in disciplinary senates are somehow
twisted.
B. Anti-discrimination Cases Against State
The problematic understanding of judicial independence as
judicial autonomy lead to the judicial corporativism in the case of the
so-called judicial anti-discrimination claims.
The story begins with the establishment of the Special Court in
Slovakia in 2004. 275 The original act that established the Special Court
guaranteed significantly higher salary to the judges of the Court
because they had to fulfill special requirements and there were risks
connected with their function of ruling on corruption cases. 276 The
salary was later tripled as there were long-term vacancies on the
Court. 277
The law on the Special Court was later challenged before the
Constitutional Court, based on the difference in the salary of judges of
Special Court and other judges. 278 The Constitutional Court did not
perform the regular test of proportionality, and simply stated that the
difference in salaries is obviously disproportionate. 279 A minority of
Constitutional Court judges had differing opinions. 280
Shortly after the verdict of the Constitutional Court in May 2009,
the judges of general courts started to file anti-discrimination claims
based on the Act on Antidiscrimination. The judges calculated how
274. Disciplinárny senát oslobodil Štefana Harabina [Disciplinary Senate liberated
Štefan Harabin], TERAZ.SK (May 13, 2016), http://www.teraz.sk/slovensko/disciplinarny-senatoslobodil-s-hara/196638-clanok.html.
275. See Memorandum to Act No. 458/2003 Coll. (May 28, 2003),
http://www.nrsr.sk/Dynamic/Download.aspx?DocID=186588 [https://perma.cc/M6S5-YVB2].
The Special Court was a court with special jurisdiction to hear cases of corruption, organized
crime, and other similar crimes. The rationale behind the establishment of the Court was to
strengthen the investigation and punishment of corruption and organized crime. Id.
276. See MP Ms. Majdová, speech in the minutes from the Parliamentary session
proposing the amendment to the Act of judges which was later adopted as Act No. 122/2005
Coll. (Mar. 17, 2005), available at https://www.psp.cz/eknih/2002nr/stenprot/041schuz/
s041022.htm [https://perma.cc/4Y4A-K99A].
277. Id.
278. See Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic no. PL. ÚS 17/08.
279. Id.
280. Id.
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much they would earn being judges of the Special Court and considered
it to be non-pecuniary damage. Almost two-thirds of judges filed such
action against the Slovak Republic. 281 As it was later found by the
chamber of the Constitutional Court, the claims were mostly either
similar or practically identical with repeated grammar mistakes from
claim to claim, indicating that these actions had been organized.282
Moreover, those mass claims were decided by the judges who
themselves filed such actions. 283 The judges mostly denied that they
might not be impartial. This legal opinion was discussed. The position
that they are indeed impartial prevailed at the Supreme Court. 284 This
practice was eventually stopped by the decision of the Constitutional
Court. The senate of the Constitutional Court stated that because the
claims were either similar or the same, the judges who claimed
discrimination would materially decide their own matter. 285 Because
“if the judge believes in her claim and we cannot reasonably assume
otherwise, it is hardly believable, ‘here and now’ practically
unbelievable, that she would decide the same matter of her colleague
differently.” 286 The Supreme Court, whose President was Harabin and
some of whose members had joined in the claims, in a majority of the
senates (panels of judges within the Supreme Court) ruled that there
was no impartiality problem for a judge who had filed a claim to rule
on another judge’s identical claim: the filing of the claim, the Court
said, was merely the expression of a legal opinion. 287 But the
Constitutional Court ruled that filing the lawsuit is not a mere
expression of the abstract legal opinion that might not harm the
impartiality, but was a concrete opinion with a preconceived idea.288
Besides that, the Supreme Court and Judicial Council actively
supported such actions and the Supreme Court even tried to “fix” the
281. See, e.g., Michaela Terenzani, Some judges rethink their wage-claim suits, THE
SLOVAK SPECTATOR (Oct. 17, 2011), https://spectator.sme.sk/c/20041359/some-judgesrethink-their-wage-claim-suits.html [https://perma.cc/C6FF-3L2B].
282. Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic no. II. ÚS 16/2011
(deciding the complaint of the Ministry of Justice against the Special Court where the Ministry
of Justice as defendant in anti-discrimination actions claimed violation of the principle of
impartiality of judges and the right to the judge established by the law).
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id.
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difference in salaries on the Supreme Court by bending the law through
changes in the work schedule of the court. This led to the
unconstitutional assignment of cases connected with these lawsuits. 289
When in 2011 Łukasz Bojarski and Werner Stemker Köster issued
the report on the Slovak judiciary prepared for the Open Society
Foundation, they stated concerning the anti-discrimination claims the
following:
The public discussions about salaries, wage discrimination cases
and bonuses have greatly undermined the authority of and respect
for the Slovak judiciary. The general belief that judges enrich
themselves is fueled by the opinion of the politicians. However,
most shocking is the evident lack of professional ethics as far as
the wage discrimination cases and the bonuses are concerned. As
for the former: it should be obvious for any judge that such a claim
should preferably never be dealt with in court and if so, may never
be judged by a judge who has a similar claim pending. 290

Besides the lack of professional ethics, judges at the time showed
widespread insensitivity, or perhaps the lack of social responsibility,
towards the economic situation in the Slovak Republic within the
context of the recent economic crisis, which probably added to the
negative public view towards the judiciary. In this instance, concepts
of independence and impartiality were bent by the judges in their
personal favor. 291
VI. CONCLUSION
Judicial independence is a term with many meanings and
applications but a singular aura. The reality is that judicial
289. Moreover, in 2010 the Judicial Council presided by Judge Harabin adopted the
resolution no. 1099 in which it commented on the legal basis of the anti-discrimination claims,
explicitly stating that there is existing discrimination and that judges should be awarded
pecuniary satisfaction. See Resolution no. 1099, THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL, (Dec. 13, 2010),
http://www.sudnarada.gov.sk/antidiskriminacne-zaloby-sudcov/
[https://perma.cc/KZQ3JJEN]. On January 2011, the Plenary meeting of the Supreme Court adopted the memorandum,
proposed by Mr. Harabin, which had the same spirit as the resolution of the Judicial Council.
Only a few judges of the Supreme Court protested and left the meeting while pointing to the fact
that the judges of the Supreme Court just expressed their opinion on the substance of the pending
cases.
290. Bojarski & Köster, supra note 224, at 111–12.
291. See id. at 110-12.
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independence is but one means toward the truly crucial end of judicial
impartiality. But judicial independence is not an absolute and must be
balanced by appropriate levels of judicial accountability and
transparency. Judicial independence in the United States is not doled
out in equal portions among federal Article III judges (the most
independent structurally) to state court judges to federal and state
administrative law judges, who are not meant to be independent in the
most accurate sense of the term at all. 292
An analysis of judicial independence in Europe makes clear that
judicial independence is not a static concept and is expressed
differently in each European state. 293 In Western Europe and among
member states of the European Union, the concept of judicial
independence has had a relatively long time to mature. Western
European states appear to have reached a certain comfort point where
the judicial independence of judges is not threatened. 294 However,
these states still face the challenges that come with maintaining an
independent judiciary, including deciding the proper balance between
independence and accountability.
In contrast, the precise concept of judicial independence in CEE
states has not yet been established. States in these regions not only have
to establish the judiciary as an independent body for the first time but
also work to separate their states from their troubling pasts. Previously
communist states try to foster public support in order to establish a
more independent judiciary from citizens who perceive the judiciary as
a corrupt arm of an oppressive executive branch. However, these states
should not be discouraged. Many Western states have slowly
established healthy, independent judiciaries in the wake of previous
rule by oppressive regimes. A key goal of these states must be to
balance judicial independence with appropriate measures of
accountability and transparency with a clear understanding that judicial
independence must prevent the government from influencing judicial
decision-making in actual cases, without preventing appropriate
inquiries by the government into judicial spending and operations and
appointments.

292. See generally Moliterno, supra note 17.
293. See Adenitire, supra note 37.
294. Zimmer, supra note 118, at 62 n.24.
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Individual countries necessarily require individual approach and
assessment of robustness of their institutions. Institutions, often taking
decades or even centuries to build, achieve high degrees of resilience
through sustained practice. 295 Only then, can stable institutions emerge
and develop their regulative and normative qualities. A giant leap in
structural setup of the judiciary, budget allocations, as well as shifts of
mindset were expected from the CEE candidate member states. Wellmeaning recommendations of the European Union, combined with
Council of Europe’s advice, represented an institutional overhaul for
candidate states, conditioned not by the recognition of necessity to put
one’s own house into order, but by financial and political motivations
of states to gain the Union’s and Council’s acclamation. This
conditionality in some instances triggered speedy procedures to adopt
reforms without proper internal discussion and considerations, almost
to the point of undermining other principles the European Union was
set to encourage and develop, such as due legislative procedures, based
on open public discourse. The tendency to speed up reform proposals
was unsurprisingly even stronger in countries, which were laggards in
the accession process, such as Slovakia, which suffered from a
democracy deficit between 1994-98, as these countries needed to catch
up and felt they had had to prove themselves. Moreover, it can also be
reasonably expected that these countries would opt for rather visible,
even radical reforms in order to seek legitimacy and endorsement from
the European Union. 296 However, such legal transplants may not turn
out to be successful.
The excessive independence, unbalanced by accountability,
created an environment in which corruption could thrive, largely
unseen and unchecked. Judicial power was consolidated in few hands,
and these hands were essentially the same as in the prior regime. The
relatively sudden opportunity to control the judiciary was seized upon
and used for personal gain and stockpiling of power.
While the formal transition from a judiciary dependent on the state
to one that must be independent of its actors occurred, the mental
transition of the judges has not occurred. With many notable exceptions
of courageous, public-minded judges, the judiciary as a whole has still
not made the transition to one that is worthy of so much independence
295. WILLIAM R. SCOTT, INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS (2nd ed. 2013).
296. Samuel Spáč, Judiciary Development After the Breakdown of Communism in the
Czech Republic and Slovakia, 9(3-4) CENT. EUR. U. POL. SCI. J. 234, 262 (2014).
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and self-governance. This should not be surprising to the European
Union, but it was plainly not considered at the time of accession.
Instead, the policy chosen was to reform structures ensuring
independence without simultaneously ensuring a judiciary staffed with
judges who were worthy of such trust. The result has been a judiciary
that is correctly mistrusted by the public, and all the consequent harms
to the Slovak people that result from a judiciary unworthy of public
trust.
The recent alarming events in Poland should give pause to states
such as Slovakia, Czech Republic, Croatia, Montenegro, and perhaps
later, Ukraine, Serbia, and Kosovo. The current Polish situation finds a
populist party (“PiS”) in control of the government, acting, and
threatening to act further to destroy judicial independence in Poland.
The actions of PiS have a surface legitimacy that is created by the
undue level of judicial independence, lack of accountability, and
internal corruption that mark not only the Polish judiciary but also other
judiciaries in the region. The Polish government can explain to the
public that the judges are out of control, have no oversight, and have
embraced corrupt practices as a result. These arguments are currently
being made to justify a move toward government take-over of the
judiciary, a move that threatens to return Poland to the absence of
judicial independence that marked the communist times and that still
exists, for example, in China. 297
The public, if not the European Union itself, have been accepting
of these Polish government justifications for taking control over the
judiciary. The recent proposal by the European Commission to the
Council to adopt a decision under Article 7 of the Treaty on European
Union, the first in the history of the European Union, 298 should not be
understood as an effort to retain the Polish judiciary as it currently
exists, but instead should be used as an opportunity to reform the Polish
judiciary, retaining the right measure of judicial independence while
adding judicial accountability and controls over the conduct of judicial
superiors such as court presidents.
297. Poland’s Ruling Law and Justice Party is Doing Lasting Damage, THE ECONOMIST
(Apr. 21, 2018), https://www.economist.com/europe/2018/04/21/polands-ruling-law-andjustice-party-is-doing-lasting-damage [https://perma.cc/L9K9-WQZ9].
298. See Press Release, European Commission, Rule of Law: European Commission
takes next step in infringement procedure to protect the independence of the Polish Supreme
Court (Aug. 14, 2018), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-4987_en.htm
(Aug. 14, 2018) [https://perma.cc/RNE7-8XNN].
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States such as Slovakia should recognize the narrow window of
opportunity that remains to get its judicial house in order before
conditions that have produced the Polish situation materialize. No
judicial independence is an untenable position for a democracy. Too
much independence can lead to none, as current events in Poland make
clear.
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